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This paper surveys the literature on the relationship between international trade in goods and 
factors and the environment. Traditional approaches based on the Heckscher-Ohlin trade 
model and more recent models looking at non-competitive market structures are discussed. 
Moreover, the paper covers intertemporal aspects (foreign debt, stock pollutants), public-
choice models (the political economy), the empirical evidence, and institutional issues. This 
paper was written for the “Handbook of Environmental and Resource Economics” to be 
edited by Jeffrey Vincent and Karl-Göran Mäler for the “Handbooks in Economics” series 
(North-Holland, Amsterdam), where a revised and probably shorter version of it will appear. 




In an interdependent world economy with globally integrated markets, the environmental 
policy of a single country is not independent anymore of what is going on in the rest of the 
world. This has been seen as a threat by many concerned groups. Industry lobbies often argue 
that tight environmental standards and high pollution taxes have a negative impact on 
competitiveness. Many environmentalists fear that international differences in environmental 
policies lead to unfavourable patterns of specialisation, e.g. developing countries becoming 
pollution havens, and an international downward competition in environmental policies which 
makes all countries, in particular the developing ones, worse off.  Examples are Cobb/Daly 
(1989), Morris (1991), Daly/Goodland (1994), Røpke (1994) and, with a Marxist dependencia 
approach, Liodakis (2000). Of course, these fears are not new but with the lowering of natural 
and institutional barriers to trade, cross-country differences in environmental legislation may 
matter more than in prior decades. Environmental and trade economists have recognised this 
problem area and the 1990s have produced a large literature on trade and the environment. 
This paper surveys the results of this literature. 
Of course, the literature on trade and the environment that has emerged in the 1990s 
has not invented the wheel. In the early 1970s, when environmental economics was 
established as a serious sub-discipline of economics, some authors already asked themselves 
how the incorporation of the international exchange of commodities and factors of production 
into the models of environmental economics would change the policy recommendations that 
have been derived for closed economies. Examples are Baumol's (1971) lecture series and 
Markusen's (1975) seminal paper. However, the international link has been a side-issue to 
most environmental economists of that time. The 1980s saw a shrinking interest in 
environmental economics in general. This was probably due to the fact that unemployment 
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and stagflation entered the arena and were being viewed as the most pressing problems 
that economists should address at the time being. In the 1990s, there was a renaissance of 
environmental economics. When globalisation became one of the catchwords in the debate, 
not only in business magazines, it was quite natural that the focus became more international. 
What is different in the open-economy environmental economics of 1990s compared to the 
1970s? I think there are basically two issues. The first one is the international dimension of 
environmental problems. In the early stages of environmental-economics theorising, 
researchers were concerned mainly with the internalisation of local or national externalities. 
In most models, the central question was which environmental policy an environmental 
protection agency should use in order to achieve first-best allocations of scarce resources. 
Since then, international environmental problems such as the depletion of the ozone layer and 
global warming have entered the agenda. The recent literature has developed tools to deal 
with issues of international environmental policy coordination (surveyed, e.g., by Barrett 
(2001) in this volume). In an international-trade context, the problem arises that even a 
country acting in a benevolent fashion by unilaterally addressing transboundary pollution and 
global environmental problems would be discouraged to do so by so-called leakage effects: 
tighter environmental standards in one country simply move the source of the problem from 
this side to the other side of the border and global pollution remains unchanged. The second 
innovation in environmental economics in the 1990s is the use of tools developed in modern 
industrial organisation theory. This made it possible to abolish the predominance of perfect 
competition models in economic theorising. Markets with a small number of polluting firms 
and strategic aspects of environmental policy making became subjects to economic analysis. 
This was not of mere academic interest. Strategic trade policy models, based on 
Brander/Spencer (1985) had a significant impact on the economic-policy debate and the 
obvious question was as to whether the results of strategic trade policy carry over to 
environmental economics. 
This survey covers both the more traditional approaches that address ideal, perfectly 
competitive economies and neglect transfrontier pollution and global environmental problems 
and the more recent literature dealing with oligopolistic or otherwise imperfectly competitive 
markets and international externalities. Part of the former has already been addressed by 
Siebert et al. (1980) and in Siebert's (1985) article in volume I of this handbook but it appears 
to be sensible to discuss this literature in a broader perspective and, of course, to incorporate 
the literature of the 1990s. More recent surveys have been written by Ulph (1997a,b). They 
are a bit selective in that they present the standard results based on factor proportions theory 
and then move to trade models based on the theory of oligopolistic markets. I wish to provide 
a more general overview and start with the traditional trade models based on the idea of 
comparative advantage. Afterwards modern approaches addressing imperfectly competitive 
markets will be considered. Moreover, I consider intertemporal issues related to the 
accumulation of pollution over time and to foreign indebtedness. Additional points to be 
covered are  international factor movements and the political economy of environmental 
policy in open economies. 
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Some technical remarks should be  made. There are two ways of modelling 
emissions of pollutants when they occur as a by-product of production activities. The first 
possibility, which is probably the straightforward one, is to model them as a joint output of 
the production process. The alternative approach is to model emissions as an input. The 
underlying idea is that natural resources are taken from the environment, used up during the 
production process, and then returned into the environment as emissions or waste. For 
instance consider a production function of an industry i, 
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with the usual properties: positive partial derivatives, negative second derivatives, positive 
cross derivatives, and concavity. Ki is capital input, Li is labour, and Ei is emissions. Then the 
production function encompasses a capital and labour intensive abatement process such that 
emissions can be reduced without affecting output only if the input of at least one other factor 
is increased.  
In many theoretical models, environmental quality is treated as a public consumption 
good, i.e. environmental disruption affects welfare directly. Environmental externalities on 
production are usually disregarded. If they are considered, the production function is changed 
such that  
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where E and E* denote aggregate emissions in the country under consideration and in the rest 
of the world and where the corresponding partial derivatives are negative. This case will also 
be discussed in this survey, albeit merely verbally as an extension. 
As regards definition of terms, it appears to be necessary what is meant by 
environmental dumping, a term often used in the public debate and in academic papers. In 
academia, environmental dumping characterises an environmental policy which does not 
completely internalise environmental externalities for reasons of international 
competitiveness and/or trade. I will use the term environmental dumping in this sense.1 
                         
1   This use of the term "ecological dumping" is in accordance with the use of the term 
"dumping" in traditional trade theory. There, dumping can be defined as pricing at less 
than marginal cost. See Davies/McGuinness (1982) and Ethier (1982). In the public 
debate, the term "environmental dumping" is often used to characterise the behaviour of a 
jurisdiction which implements laxer environmental standards than other jurisdictions. 
This view is based on the premise that environmental standards and taxes should be equal 
everywhere. As is well-known from the trade literature, there are good reasons for 
environmental regulation to differ internationally and, therefore, this definition does not 
make much sense. An alternative definition chosen by Rauscher (1994a) is based on a 
distinction between tradable and nontradable goods. 
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This survey is organised as follows. The first section covers the traditional trade 
theories based on factor proportions. Important questions are what determines the patterns of 
trade, whether or not trade is beneficial, whether openness causes ecological dumping, and 
whether trade restrictions trade restrictions should be used to improve environmental quality. 
Section 2 is concerned with non-competitive models of international trade. Second-best 
considerations become important since non-competitive market structure constitute a second 
distortion in the economy besides the environmental externality. In Section 3, I will look at 
the political economy of environmental policy in open economies. This approach explains 
why inefficient or biased policies are chosen by the policy maker and they make predictions 
on the direction of the bias. Afterwards, international factor movements and the issues of 
location are considered. Again the issue of ecological dumping and the race towards the 
bottom are of major concern. Section 5 is concerned with intertemporal aspects of the 
environmental problem. I will look at stock pollutants, that are accumulated over time, and at 
the problem of foreign indebtedness. Section 6 deals with the empirical evidence, section 7 
with institutional issues and section 8 draws some conclusions.   
 
1  Environmental regulation and comparative advantage 
The problem that foreign trade and environmental policy might be interdependent has been a 
topic of economic analysis since the early seventies. Baumol (1971) is probably the first 
reference dealing with the issue from an economic-theory perspective. Others such as 
Markusen (1975), Pethig (1976), Siebert (1977, 1979) , Asako (1979), Siebert et al. (1980), 
McGuire (1982) have elaborated and refined these models and more recent contributions 
include Merrifield (1988), Krutilla (1991), Anderson (1992), Lloyd ((1992), Snape (1992), 
Chichilnisky (1994a), Copeland/Taylor (1994a,b, 1995, 1999), Steininger (1994a,b), 
Rauscher (1997, Ch. 5). The factor abundance approach to trade and the environment has 
been surveyed by Ulph (1997a,b). The survey provided here summarises the results in a non-
technical fashion, using partial-equilibrium diagrammatical approaches. The limitations of 
this approach will be mentioned and generalisations will be discussed. The algebraic version 
of this can be found in Ulph's survey papers (1997a,b). 
 
1.1  The endowment of a country with environmental resources 
In Heckscher-Ohlin theory of international trade, the patterns of trade are determined by 
relative endowment differences. Countries relatively well endowed with environmental 
resources are expected to export environmentally intensively produced, or loosely speaking: 
"dirty", commodities. Countries poorly endowed with environmental resources tend to export 
"clean" commodities. What constitutes the endowment of a country with natural resources? 
As far as other factors of production are concerned, endowments are usually considered as 
being determined by exogenous supply which is assumed to be inelastic in most models. This 
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is possible also with environmental resources.  Let K, L, and E be a country's exogenously 
given endowments with capital, labour, and resources, respectively. Then relative 
endowments can be represented by in a triangle. This way of depicting factor endowments has 
been introduced by Leamer (1987). See Figure 1. The sides of the triangles measure relative 
factor abundance, K/L, E/L, and K/E, respectively. Units are chosen such that the factor 
endowment of the world as a whole is located in the centre of the triangle. All countries 
located on the dashed line have the same capital-labour ratios but country A is more resource-
abundant than country B and should export the environmentally intensive good provided that 
everything else is equal, preferences are homothetic, and technologies are linear homogenous. 
 
------- insert Figure 1 about  here  
 
The endowment of a country with environmental resources is by no means given but is 
a result of a political process which determines the availability of environmental resources for 
economic activities. Chichilnisky (1994a,b), for instance, has emphasised that countries with 
similar natural endowments of environmental resources may differ substantially in the 
availability of these resources for economic activities. What determines the availability of 
environmental resources is the environmental policy chosen by the country's government. It 
depends on the following factors: 
•  Natural abundance. Countries differ in their physical endowments with environmental 
resources. This does not only apply to resources like petroleum and ores but in a more 
general sense to all kinds of environmental resources that are used for economic activities, 
e.g. clean air and water. Factors that determine the abundance of these factor are stocks of 
renewable resources, the assimilative capacity of nature and climatic variables.  
•  Demand for environmental quality. People in different countries differ in their willingness 
and ability to pay for environmental quality. Willingness and ability to pay is an 
increasing function of income. See Panayotou's (2001) contribution in this volume for a 
comprehensive overview on the issue. The impact of income-dependent differences in 
environmental regulation on trade has been considered by Copeland/Taylor (1994). 
Moreover, willingness to pay is affected by tastes.  
•  Demand for final goods. In countries with a low demand for environmentally intensively 
produced goods, environmental resources will be abundant relative to needs. In other 
words: Emission taxes or implicit shadow prices for environmental goods tend to be low. 
In many theoretical trade models this effect is irrelevant since preferences are assumed to 
be internationally identical and homothetic.  
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•  The impact of lobbies.  Environmental  policy does not always represent the will 
of the voters but it is captured and biased by various interest groups ranging from industry 
lobbies to environmentalists. 
•  The conduct of environmental policy. It is not only important to have environmental 
regulations and norms. These regulations and norms must also be enforced. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that this has been a problem particularly in developing countries and 
centrally planned economies but also in the first world. Enforcement deficits create 
comparative advantages for environmentally intensive industries.2 
Having mentioned the determinants of a country's endowment with environmental resources, 
one can now apply the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson theorem: 
"A country (on average) exports environmentally intensively produced commodities 
if it is well-endowed with environmental resources."  
or the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek theorem: 
"A country well-endowed with environmental resources is a net exporter of 
environmental services embodied in traded commodities" 
The term "on average" vanishes in the two-factors, two-commodities case. In higher 
dimensional cases, there may be some environmentally intensive commodities that are 
imported by a country well-endowed with environmental resources. See Bhagwati (1972), 
Dixit/Norman (1980, ch.4), Deardorff (1982), and Ethier (1984). One can conclude from this 
that countries with lax environmental policies tend to export environmentally intensively 
produced commodities. Besides the "on average" caveat of the many-factors many-goods 
case, there are three important exceptions from this rule: 
•  External effects of emissions on productivity. If environmental pollution has significant 
effects on factor productivities, the predictions may be reversed. A country with a lax 
environmental policy experiences environmental disruption. This may affect different 
industries differently. Factor endowment effects may be dominated by Ricardian 
productivity effects and the patterns of specialisation may be reversed. See 
Copeland/Taylor (1999).3 If transfrontier pollution is considered, emissions originating 
                         
2    It is interesting to note that some centrally planned economies had very tight environ-
mental standards, particularly in the 1980s. In Poland, one even introduced emission 
taxes. See Zylicz (1994). However, these standards were often not enforced and emission 
taxes turned out to be irrelevant for socialist enterprises, whose soft budget constraints 
were rarely binding. This experience illustrates the enforcement deficits of environmental 
policy existing in many countries. 
3    Exterrnalities of this kind have been addressed by Herberg/Kemp (1969) and 
Herberg/Kemp/Tawada (1982), however not in an environmental-economics framework. 
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from the foreign country can have an  effect  on  environmental  quality  and,  thus, 
on productivities in the home country. As an example, consider a situation were without 
transfrontier pollution the home country would have a comparative advantage in tourism. 
This may be turned into a comparative disadvantage if the country suffers from 
environmental disruption originating from abroad. 
•  An impact of environmental quality on the patterns of demand. Assume the home country 
is physically well-endowed with environmental resources and therefore would have a 
comparative advantage for environmentally intensively produced commodities if demand 
were homothetic and independent of environmental quality. If environmental pollution 
now has a negative impact on the demand for the other, "clean", commodity, then this may 
reduce the autarky price of the "clean" commodity by so much that the comparative 
advantage is shifted to the less environmentally intensively produced commodity. See 
Pethig (1976). 
•  Environmental externalities of consumption. If consumption also generates environmental 
pollution, then a strict environmental policy reduces the demand for the commodity which 
is environmentally intensive in consumption. This price reduction may reinforce, weaken, 
or reverse the impact of environmental regulation on supply-side comparative advantage. 
See Rauscher (1997, ch. 5.3). 
Figure 2 illustrates these effects in a partial-equilibrium diagram. Let q denote the quantity of  
a commodity and let p denote its price, measured in units of a numéraire. S and D are the 
supply and demand functions, respectively. If all parameters in the two countries are the 
identical then the domestic equilibrium price in autarky equals the foreign autarky price, p*. 
Now consider a change in the domestic environmental policy: environmental standards or 
taxes are relaxed. Normally, the domestic supply function is shifted downwards since 
marginal production cost is reduced. This results in a new price p1 lower than p* and the 
home country becomes an exporter of this commodity. If there are external effects on 
production, however, the higher level of environmental pollution, however, may raise 
marginal cost such that the supply function is shifted upwards to S" and the comparative 
advantage is reversed. In the case of transfrontier pollution, a situation can be imagined in 
which the production of the foreign numéraire good  is negatively affected. This reduces the 
foreign relative price from its initial level p*. In the case of negative externalities of 
consumption, lax environmental policies increase demand from D to D'  and the domestic 
producer price may rise to p2.  
In the many goods, many factors case, all the effects may be reversed by general-
equilibrium repercussions, but "on average" the effects are maintained for the economy as a 
whole. 
                                                                              
In their models, external effects on production are related the outputs of industries, but 
not to the inputs of particular factors like environmental resources. 
   8
 
1.2  Environmental Policy and Competitiveness 
All the statements made above are based on the notion that improvements environmental 
quality can be achieved only at the cost of reducing private-sector output and consumption. 
The phenomenon of productivity externalities, where tighter environmental standards have a 
positive effect on factor productivities is an exception to this rule but probably of limited 
practical relevance, at least on the aggregate scale. In general, tight environmental standards 
and high emission taxes tend to harm regulated industries and reduce their competitiveness. It 
has, however, been observed that in some cases industries have in the longer term benefited  
from strict environmental regulation. Porter (1990) has argued that firms in Northern Europe 
and Japan have actually benefited from the introduction of tighter environmental standards. 
He then stated his famous "Porter hypothesis": there are not only environmental gains from 
stricter regulation but one should also expect improvements in competitiveness. The 
conclusion is then that a green policy is not only in the interest of environmental lobby groups 
but also of the regulatees: green environmental policy can be part of strategic industrial policy 
aiming at improving the international competitiveness of the domestic economy. See Porter 
(1991) and Porter/van der Linde (1995). Palmer/Oates/Portney (1995), in contrast, argue that 
there is no gain without pain. Imposing restrictions on the choice set of a single rationally 
acting firm or individual cannot improve its  well-being. This basic economic wisdom is, 
however, not sufficient in refuting the Porter hypothesis. There are several explanations as to 
why the hypothesis could be valid in spite of this. 
•  The first argument is inefficiency. Leibenstein (1966),in his article on X-inefficincy, has 
argued that firms do general not produce on the edges of their production possibility sets. 
There are inefficiencies that are recovered only if the firm is put under some external 
stress. See Frantz (1989) for a broader overview.  This external stress or pressure may be 
due to tightening environmental standards. The reduction of the profit margin makes the 
firm recover new potentials for increasing efficiency. Although this may explain why 
some firms subject to strict environmental standards have in the longer term been better 
off than unregulated firms, this does not imply that a green strategy is the appropriate way 
of achieving competitiveness. Other instruments may be superior in removing X-
inefficiency. 
•  Another argument is the first-mover advantage. Governments that move first in the 
implementation of tight environmental standards impose additional costs on domestic 
firms. However, when other governments follow the trend towards greener policies, 
domestic firms have already adjusted to these standards and enjoy a competitive 
advantage over foreign firms. This argument postulates that the private sector is ignorant 
and myopic and does not foresee trends in future environmental regulation. Even if this is 
the case, the policy implication would be that the private sector be better informed about 
future trends in environmental regulation. Tighter environmental standards and high 
emission taxes are a rather indirect way of solving this information problem. 
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•  Finally, it is possible that there are  strategic reasons for tighter environmental 
policies. In oligopolistic markets, it is possible that the government can improve private 
profits by restricting the choice set of individual firms. The underlying reason is that firms 
are unable to commit themselves to follow non-profit-maximising that would yield higher 
profits in the resulting Nash equilibrium of a oligopoly game. The government then is the 
first mover and provides the credible commitment in an earlier stage of the game. This is 
the foundation of strategic trade policy and the idea has been applied to international 
environmental economics as well.  
If one believes in rational economic agents and competitive markets, the Porter hypothesis 
is discarded easily. Both assumptions are, however, unlikely to be met in reality. Whether 
strict environmental  policy is good or bad for competitiveness, then is an empirical 
question. Theoretical aspects should be investigated in a non-competitive model 
framework. Both issues will be taken up later in this survey. 
 
1.3  Trade Liberalisation and the Gains from Trade 
In the standard neoclassical models of international trade, free trade is always better than 
autarky. See, for instance, Dixit/Norman (1980) for a general proof. Trade liberalisation is the 
removal of a set of restrictions that constrain the economy. With free trade the consumption 
possibility set of the economy is larger than its production possibility set. The choice set is 
broadened with autarky still being an option. In a first-best world, the removal of a restriction 
is always beneficial. barrier to trade is always beneficial if this barrier is the only distortion of 
the economy. This is a generalisable result from public economics which carries over to 
situations where environmental pollution matters. Thus, if all environmental externalities are 
appropriately internalised, free trade is always preferable to autarky.  
Matters are different in second-best situations. According to the theory of second best, 
the removal of a market distortion can be harmful if there exists a second distortion and if the 
first distortion partially offsets the second one. Since environmental policies in most of the 
cases do not exactly internalise environmental externalities, a second externality is likely to 
exist, and it is questionable whether the gains from trade are positive. 
Two scenarios may be distinguished. In the first scenario, emissions are given and do 
not change when relative prices change after trade liberalisation. This may be the case if the 
government has fixed an emission target which is allocated to individual polluters either by 
command and control or by a tradable permits scheme. In the second scenario, the emissions 
are variable and are affected by relative-prices changes. This is possible it, for instance, 
emission taxes are used as the instrument of environmental policy. Other policies that keep 
emissions variable are imaginable, e.g. command-and-control regulations that restrict 
emissions per unit of output: if output rises, emissions are increased. 
Let τ denote a trade tax which is reduced (or even removed) when trade is liberalised. The 
gains from trade, dw/dτ, can be decomposed as follows 
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where u(C,E) is utility or welfare depending on the consumption vector, C, and the level of 
emissions, E, where E may be a vector if more than one (aggregate) pollutant is considered. 
See Siebert (1977) and Rauscher (1997, ch. 5.5). The first term on the right-hand side of 
equation 1 denotes the efficiency gains from trade it is always negative, i.e. an increase in 
barriers to trade reduces welfare. This is the standard result from trade theory. The second 
term is zero of environmental pollution does not matter or of trade liberalisation does not 
change environmental policy. If E is a scalar, then the interpretation of this term is straight-
forward. Depending on the patterns of trade, dE/dτ can be positive or negative. A country 
exporting environmentally intensively produced commodities experiences an increase in 
emissions, a country importing such goods experiences an improvement in environmental 
quality (unless the regulation is such that emissions are fixed). The term in brackets consist of 
two components. The first one denotes the effect of increased emissions on the consumption 
possibility set. This is usually positive unless external effects of emissions on production are 
substantial. The second term denotes the marginal environmental damage, which is always 
negative. The term in brackets as a whole is zero if the optimal environmental regulation has 
been chosen, i.e. if marginal environmental damage equals marginal abatement cost. If 
environmental regulation is too strict, the term in brackets is positive: additional emissions 
improve welfare. If environmental regulation is too lax, the term in brackets is negative: 
welfare is reduced by additional emissions. 
To illustrate the gains from trade, Figures 2 and 3 are used. They are adapted from 
Anderson (1992) and show a partial equilibrium for a single country becoming an exporter or 
an importer of the commodity, respectively, after trade liberalisation. In both cases, the 
production of the commodity generates emissions. D is the demand curve. MPC and MSC 
denote marginal private and social costs of production, respectively. MPC is the supply curve 
in the case of optimal environmental policy p
P and p
S denote the corresponding equilibrium 
prices in autarky and p
w is the world market price after trade liberalisation. Quantities are 
depicted only for the trade case, q
c denotes consumption, q
P is output without environmental 
regulation, q
S is output in the case of perfect internalisation. 
 
-----  insert Figures 2  and 3 about here 
 
Figure 2 looks at the country becoming an exporter of the pollution-intensive good. In 
the case of perfect internalisation, the gain from trade is triangle a. In the case of incomplete 
internalisation, the private gain from trade is larger because lax regulation reinforces 
comparative advantage. It is triangle a+b+c+d. However, this comes at the cost of increased 
pollution, d+e. Thus, the net welfare effect is a+b+c-e, and this may well be negative. In 
figure 3, the same exercise is done for the importing country. With optimal environmental 
policies, the gain from trade is a+b+c+d+e. With non-optimal environmental regulation, the 
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autarky price is closer to the world market  price such that the private gain from trade is 
only c. However, there is a second dividend from improved environmental quality measured 
by the area b+e+f such that total gain from trade is c+b+e+f. 
Similar arguments apply if consumption – not production – is considered as a some of 
environmental disruption. See again Anderson (1992) for a graphical representation and 
Rauscher (1997, ch. 3.5) for an algebraic derivation of the main results. If the commodity 
which is pollution intensive in consumption is exported, then its price is higher than in 
autarky, domestic consumption is less, and this is good for the environment. In an analogous 
faction, trade liberalisation has negative effect on the environment if the imported commodity 
is pollution-intensive when consumed. The welfare effect again depends on the adequacy of 
environmental regulation. If environmental regulation is too lax, then the increase in 
environmental pollution may offset the efficiency from trade, and the overall gains from trade 
may be negative. 
The theoretical literature on trade and the environment has neglected the 
environmental impact of transportation. Figure 4 is a partial-equilibrium representation of this 
problem. The country under consideration becomes an importer of the commodity after trade 
liberalisation. The relevant world market price is p
w. If the transport externalities are 
internalised, the price is raised to p
w+ß. With such an environmental policy, the gain from 
trade is a. Without environmental policy, the private gain from trade is a+c but there are 
environmental damages measured by the rectangle b+c+d such that the welfare effect is 
reduced to a-b-d, and this may be negative. Basically, this is the same effect as that of an 
import subsidy. Here, the subsidy is paid not in money but in terms of environmental 
disruption. 
 
------ insert Figure 4 about here 
 
Besides the three effects that trade theory is mostly concerned with (production, 
consumption, and transport) some additional effects have to be considered: 
-  Trade in primary commodities. In standard trade models, traded goods are final 
commodities, trade in primary commodities is often neglected albeit it is of major concern, 
particularly in an environmental context. An important example is trade in fossil fuels. 
Here it is the importing country’s utilisation of these commodities in production and 
consumption that generates environmental disruption. Thus, the same arguments as in the 
case of polluting consumption apply. 
-  Trade in hazardous waste. Trade in toxic and hazardous waste is trade in bads, not in 
goods. In other word, the good which is traded is not the hazardous waste but the service of  
storing and treating it. Thus, the conclusions are the same as in the case of polluting 
production. The country importing the waste (exporting the service) may be better off in 
the case of insufficient regulation, the waste-exporting country exports its environmental 
problem and is better off. See Rauscher (1997, ch. 4) and Rauscher (2000). 
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-  Transfrontier pollution.  Trade  liberalisation may lead to an increase in 
transfrontier pollution if the trading-partner country expands its pollution-intensive 
activities or to a reduction in transfrontier pollution if it reduces its environmentally 
harmful activities. This transfrontier pollution may offset the own-pollution effects of trade 
liberalisation. 
The insights to be derived from this literature are twofold. In the first-best case, trade 
liberalisation is beneficial to all parties involved. If there are additional distortions in the 
economy, anything can happen. Underregulated countries tend to be worse off if they export 
environmentally produced commodities. This is of particular concern for developing 
countries. From the theoretical literature, it is not possible to derive unambiguous predictions 
on the effect of trade liberalisation on environmental quality. In some countries, it will be 
improved, in others, it will be deteriorated, depending on the pattern of specialisation. The 
aggregate effect on the environment is therefore unclear. Many of the theoretical models on 
which these conclusions are based, however, neglect environmentally intensive consumption 
and transport. Since these activities increase after trade liberalisation, there is an additional 
negative impact on the environment. It should be noted, however, that all this is based on the 
assumption that environmental regulation remains unchanged after trade liberalisation. But 
this is far from clear. 
 
1.4  Changes in Environmental Policy after Trade Liberalisation 
Simple comparative-static analysis of the effects of trade liberalisation is based on the 
premise that environmental policies remain unchanged after the move from autarky to free 
trade is undertaken. This is a static view which neglects the effects of trade on relative prices, 
income, and environmental disruption. Welfare maximising governments should adjust their 
environmental policies to changes in these variables. This is considered by Rauscher (1997, 
141-142) and Antweiler/Copeland/Taylor (1998). Both of these approaches are algebraic and 
rather technical. This can be avoided by a simple verbal argument based on the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem. This theorem states that the price of the factor used intensively in the 
export industry raises after trade liberalisation and the price of the factor used intensively in 
the import-competing industry is lower under free trade than in autarky. The Stolper-
Samuelson theorem is based on the assumption of fixed factor endowments. Therefore assume 
that the level of pollution is determined by environmental policy and that the price of the 
environmental resource is determined in a market for emission permits. This is the standard 
Heckscher-Ohlin model set-up. 
Let us consider a situation where the environmental regulation is optimal in autarky, 
i.e. the implicit emission tax or the price of a tradable emission permit equals the marginal 
environmental damage. In a next step the country is opened to free trade. As a consequence 
the price of the environmentally intensively produced good will rise if this is good is exported 
and it will fall if the good is imported. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem then implies that the 
prices of emission permits rise if the country exports "dirty" goods and it falls if the country 
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exports  "clean"  goods.  Let  us  look  at  these  two types of countries separately. For a 
moment, income effects are disregarded. Thus, in this first step, I treat marginal 
environmental damage as being independent of income. 
-  The exporter of "dirty" goods. The price of an emission permit exceeds the marginal 
environmental damage. This means that environmental regulation must be relaxed. The 
number of emission permits provided by the government should be increased. 
Environmental pollution rises. Note, however, that this raises marginal environmental 
damage. Thus, the resulting price of the emission permit be higher than in autarky. Thus, 
emissions have increased but implicit pollution taxes are higher than in autarky. If the 
latter are interpreted as a measure of environmental stringency, then this country uses a 
stricter environmental policy after trade liberalisation than in autarky. 
-  The exporter of "clean" goods. The price of an emission permit is less than the marginal 
environmental damage. The government should reduce the number of emission permits. 
Environmental pollution is reduced. Marginal environmental damage is lower than in 
autarky and this implies that the resulting implicit emission tax rate is lower than in 
autarky as well. Emissions are reduced and but environmental policy is laxer than in 
autarky.  
These effects are related to what Antweiler/Copeland/Taylor (1998) term "composition 
effects". Besides these, there is an income effect. International trade enlarges the consumption 
possibility set and, therefore, has a positive impact on income. Since environmental quality is 
a normal good, having a positive income elasticity, one should, ceteris paribus, expect tighter 
environmental policies and lower emissions in all countries. Whether this effect dominates the 
composition effect in the case of an exporter of "clean" goods is  an empirical matter. 
Two additional effects have to be considered. First, consumption, too, has a negative 
impact on the environment. To consider consumption externalities it is more convenient to 
look at emission  taxes than at tradable permits. A country importing goods that are pollution-
intensive in consumption consumes more of these goods than in autarky and, therefore, 
emissions and marginal environmental damages rise. This requires higher emission taxes. The 
opposite reasoning applies to the country exporting these goods. Domestic consumption is 
reduced. Due to lower marginal damage, environmental should be reduced. This may be 
called a "demand composition effect". Second, one should take into account that international 
transportation is environmentally harmful as well and this requires the introduction of taxes 
on transportation. 
If we now take into account that income does change after trade liberalisation, two 
additional effects have to be taken into account. On the one hand, there is an increase in the 
level of economic activity, leading to increasing aggregate emissions. This is the "scale 
effect". This implies that optimal emission taxes should be reduced. Finally, the increase in 
income after trade liberalisation has an impact on marginal environmental damage. Since 
demand for environmental quality is normal, i.e. it has a positive income elasticity, the 
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marginal environmental damage is raised as  a  response to the income increase. 
Environmental regulation should be tightened and emissions be reduced. 
Which one of these three effects dominates, is an empirical matter. Thus, it is unclear 
whether aggregate emissions will rise or fall as a consequence of trade liberalisation and 
whether or not tighter environmental policies will be employed. What can be said, however, is 
that the possibility to adjust environmental policies after trade liberalisation reinforces the 
positive gains from trade in the case of perfect internalisation.  
  
1.5  Environmental Policies in Open Economies 
In an small open economy, environmental policy should be designed according to the 
Pigouvian tax rule. The emission tax or the implicit shadow price of the environmental 
resource should equal the environmental damage. The reason is that there is only one 
distortion, i.e. the environmental externality, and this can be taken care of by the appropriate 
policy instrument, i.e. an emission tax or standard. Moreover, a small country has no power in 
international markets that it can use to manipulate prices and exploit foreign consumers. Let 
D(E,E*) be the damage function depending on domestic and foreign emissions with positive 
first and second partial derivatives and a positive cross derivative. The optimal emission tax 
for pollutant i, ti, equals marginal domestic environmental damage, 
  , (2) 
i E i D t =
Of course, there is no incentive to internalise foreign environmental damage if the 
government follows purely national welfare objectives. 
Matters are different if a large open economy is considered. This case has been 
analysed by Markusen (1975) in a general-equilibrium framework and by Krutilla (1991), 
Llloyd (1992) and Snape (1992) in partial equilibrium. See Rauscher (1997, ch. 5) for 
extensions of the standard model. What are the effects of a change in environmental policy in 
such a country. First, if environmental externalities have only small effects on productivity, 
there is a detrimental effect on output and consumption. Second, there is a positive effect on 
environmental quality. If the economy were small, the environmental policy should be 
designed such that these effects cancel out at the margin. In a large open economy, there are 
two additional effects.  
•  The first one is a terms-of-trade effect. Tighter environmental policy increases the prices 
of environmentally intensively produced commodities by more than those of commodities 
with relatively clean production processes. Thus, the country's terms of trade improve if it 
is an exporter of "dirty" products and they deteriorate if it is an exporter of "clean" 
products. Should consumption be the source of the environmental externality, then tighter 
environmental policies have negative effects on the demand for "dirty" products their 
world market prices are reduced and this is good if the country under consideration is an 
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importer of the commodity and  bad  if  the  country is an exporter. As an example 
consider the game between the industrialised countries and the OPEC in the 1970s and 
1980s. Of course, the oil price shocks of that time amounted to a terms-of-trade 
deterioration for the oil-importing countries. For reasons of energy conservation and 
environmental protection, many of these countries raised their energy taxes which reduced 
world energy demand, contributed to the erosion of the OPEC cartel. 
•  The second one is the leakage effect. If world market prices change, this can have an 
impact on foreign emissions. In the cases of transfrontier pollution and global environ-
mental problems, this change in foreign emissions affects domestic environmental quality 
and domestic welfare. There are two mechanisms that explain leakage effects. In the case 
of pollution-intensive production, tighter environmental policies raise the world market 
prices of pollution-intensive goods. This implies that the marginal value product of the 
environmental factor of production increases in the rest of the world. If emissions are 
fixed by environmental policies, e.g. in the framework of a tradable-permits scheme, 
nothing happens. If however, the foreign country uses emission taxes as its environmental 
policy instrument, then the wedge between the marginal value product and the emission 
tax induces producers to utilise more of the environmental resource, and the foreign 
emissions are increased. The other mechanism is relevant if consumption goods or 
intermediates such as fossil fuels are traded. Tighter environmental standards reduce the 
demand for these commodities and, therefore, world market prices. This induces 
additional demand elsewhere. Both mechanisms discussed here lead to a negative leakage 
effect. Tighter environmental standards at home lead to more emissions abroad, and this 
has a negative impact on domestic welfare. 
Environmental policy in a large country should take leakage and effects terms-of-trade 
effects into account. In the two-goods case, the problem the government has to solve is to 
maximise 
  ( ) * , , ), ( ), ( 2 1
2 1 E E E p X F p pX F u w − + = , (3) 
where  u( ) is a utility function with the conventional properties, the first two arguments 
denoting consumption of commodities 1 and 2, where X(p) is the country's exports of 
commodity 2 and p is the terms of trade, i.e. the relative price of the export good. In the large 
country case, X(.) depends on the relative price of the export good since domestic exports by 
definition equal foreign imports and foreign import demand depends on the price. Thus X'(p) 
< 0. The last three arguments are emissions; they have a negative impact on welfare, and this 
reflects the disutility from environmental disruption. This function is maximised with respect 
to domestic emissions. Some terms cancel out since the marginal-value products of the other 
factors are equal across sectors in the Heckscher-Ohlin and since the relative price equals the 
marginal rate of substitution. The marginal products of emissions then determines the 
emission tax rates: 
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Where    and 
i E D * E D  denote marginal environmental damage measured in terms of the 
numéraire.  The first term on the right-hand side is the direct marginal environmental damage, 
the second term is the terms-of-trade effect, which can be negative or positive, depending on 
whether the country is a net exporter or net importer of environmentally harmful goods and 
depending on whether environmental disruption is caused by production or consumption. This 
model can be extended easily to encompass consumption externalities (see Rauscher (1997, p. 
150). The following conclusions can be drawn: 
•  The terms-of-trade term is positive if the country exports commodities that are harmful in 
production or if it imports commodities that are harmful when consumed or used in 
downstream production processes. 
•  The terms-of-trade term is negative if the country imports commodities that are harmful in 
production or if it exports commodities that are harmful when consumed or used in 
downstream production processes.  
Finally, the third term is the leakage term, and it is always negative. 
The following implications can be drawn from this result. Neglecting transfrontier 
pollution for a moment, it is not clear that countries have incentives to engage in 
environmental dumping, i.e. to use emission taxes or standards that under-internalise 
environmental externalities. This depends on their position  in the international division of 
labour. Countries exporting environmentally intensively produced goods by no means 
benefits from lax environmental standards (an argument which is frequently made by 
environmentalists) Instead, they should use stricter standards than in autarky. However, given 
that the impact of environmental regulation on trade is very small empirically (see Section   of 
this essay), its impact on the terms of trade is to be expected to be small as well and the 
corresponding tax component should be small. Thus, it is rather unlikely that terms-of-trade 
considerations influence environmental policies. An exception possibly is the energy market, 
where some countries rely almost completely on imports to satisfy their demand on fossil 
fuels. In such cases, an environmental tax has the same effect as an optimal tariff. See Snape 
(1992) for diagrammatical illustrations of this case. The existence of leakage effects leads to 
environmental dumping. The objective, however, is not to increase the international 
competitiveness of domestic industries but to reduce transfrontier pollution from abroad. 
Leakage reduces the benefits of tighter environmental standards because part of the 
environmental improvement achieved through lower domestic emissions is offset by the 
increase in foreign emissions.  
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-------- insert Figure 5 about here 
 
It would be interesting to derive more general conclusions by looking at strategic 
interactions of different countries that use environmental policies that take terms-of-trade and 
leakage effects into account. However, this is not possible for the general case.4 What can be 
done is to look at the impact of leakage in the case of identical countries. The terms-of-trade 
component in the optimal tax rate vanishes because there is no trade anymore. Then one can 
consider a representative large country. This is depicted in Figure 5. The horizontal axis 
measures emissions, the vertical axis marginal benefits and marginal costs. The negatively 
sloped line represents the marginal  benefit, MB, from increased emissions in terms  of higher 
consumption levels. It has a negative slope due to declining marginal productivities. The 
positively sloped lines represent environmental damages. The highest line measures total 
environmental damage in the home country and abroad, the medium line represents damage in 
the home country only, and the lowest line takes the leakage effect into account: higher 
emissions at home lead to less emissions abroad. In an international environmental agreement, 
the optimal emissions level would be E
O, in autarky or in the small country case it would be 
E
A, and if leakage effects are taken into account, it is E
L. The corresponding emission taxes 
can be found along the MB curve. A small open or autarchic economy following purely 
national policy objectives could increase its welfare by reducing emissions and the welfare 
gain is area a. A large country acting in its own interest, however, would experience a welfare 
loss measured by b and c if the rest of the world does the same. Leakage effects tend to 
amplify international externality problems. In the case of transfrontier pollution, a country has 
insufficient incentives to internalise external environmental effects. If leakage matters, these 
weak incentives are eroded even further. 
 
1.6  Trade Interventions as an Instrument of Environmental Policy 
There are basically four motives for using trade interventions to achieve environmental 
goals:5 
                         
4    The reason for this is the occurrence of second derivatives of the production function in 
the first-order condition determining the emission tax rate. It is explained  by the fact that 
the private-sector optimality conditions enter the government's objective function as a 
constraint. Comparative statics based on the government's optimality conditions then 
contain third derivatives.  
5    For a broad overview of "green tariff" issues in theoretical economic framework, see 
Kraus (2000). 
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•  As a substitute for harmonisation of  environmental  regulation.  Countries  with 
tight environmental standards impose tariffs or other restrictions on the imports of foreign 
goods that have been produced under less restrictive environmental regulation.  
•  As a means to avoid or reduce a negative impact of trade on the environment and on 
economic welfare. If trade is harmful, then trade restrictions must be beneficial. 
•  As a means to reduce environmental leakage. Leakage results from changes in the terms 
of trade, and tariffs are the first best instrument to influence the terms of trade. 
•  As a means to stabilise international environmental agreements. Trade restrictions can be 
used as sanctions to enforce compliance. 
The first type of trade intervention resembles the anti-dumping duty of conventional 
trade theory, albeit only to a very limited extent. Anti-dumping measures should be based on 
the dumping margin, i.e. either the difference between the foreign country's home market 
price and its (lower) export price or the difference by which marginal production costs exceed 
the price. International  differences in environmental regulation constitute differences in 
production costs but these may be just reflections of differences in factor endowments, i.e. in 
natural scarcities. Levelling the playing field by creating trade distortions that smooth 
international differences eliminates comparative advantages that are the basis for gains from 
trade. See Bhagwati (1996). If foreign environmental regulation does not internalise foreign 
environmental costs, then this can be interpreted as indirect subsidisation of environmentally 
harmful production. In this case, the countervailing-duty argument may apply. See Markusen 
et al. (1995) for a simple geometric representation. If the foreign country uses an export 
subsidy (or if it relaxes environmental standards in its exporting sectors), then this leads to the 
deterioration of its terms of trade and to an inefficient extension of its production of the export 
good. A countervailing duty, i.e. a tariff imposed by the importing country, reduces foreign 
output of this good and thus re-establishes global efficiency. Moreover, the domestic terms of 
trade are even further improved. In the extreme case, the foreign subsidy plus domestic 
countervailing duty has the same effect as free trade plus a lump-sum transfer from the 
foreign to the home country. It should be noted, however, that the domestic motive for the 
trade intervention is a simple terms-of-trade argument, which is not related to environmental 
issues and which applies only in the large-country case. In the small-country, case tariffs are 
always harmful at least as long as there are no other distortions in the domestic economy 
If there are distortions, then second-best considerations apply. If, for instance, the 
domestic environmental regulation is non-optimal, then trade interventions may be beneficial. 
This can be seen from Figure 2. If the country with sub-optimal environmental regulation is 
worse off after trade liberalisation, it benefits from restricting international trade. However, 
the trade restriction is not the first-best instrument here. The appropriate intervention would 
be to use the right environmental policy that correctly accounts for environmental scarcity. 
Thus, the negative-gains-from-trade argument is ultimately not convincing. 
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Green tariffs are appropriate  instruments  for  assessing  pollution  leakage 
effects. It has been argued earlier that leakage effects are caused by changes in relative world 
market prices caused by changes in a country's environmental policy. The optimal instrument 
to assess relative prices on international markets, i.e. the terms of trade, is the optimal tariff. 
This is intuitive but it can also be shown algebraically. See Markusen (1975) for the first 
derivation of the result. An optimal environmental policy in the presence of trade 
interventions can be characterised as follows. 
Environmental externalities should be internalised by Pigouvian taxes, i.e. the tax rate 
should equal the marginal domestic environmental damage: t
i E i D = .Moreover, in a two-
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See Rauscher (1997, 151). The first component is the classical optimum tariff depending on 
the shape of the foreign import demand curve. X(p) denotes exports. Thus if X(p)<0, then this 
means that the commodity is imported and X/X'>0 is related to the foreign country's export 
supply elasticity. This is well-known from the trade literature. The second component is the 
leakage component.  p is the relative price of the country's export good. If an increase in this 
price reduces emissions, i.e. if dE*/dp<0, then the tariff  rate is increased by transfrontier 
pollution. If, an increase in the price, rises emissions, the tariff rate is negatively affected by 
pollution leakage. Of course, the size of the tariff rate depends on the significance of 
transfrontier pollution, i.e. on the marginal environmental damage caused by foreign 
emissions in the home country, DE* . In higher-dimensional models, with more than two 
goods, a system of trade taxes should be introduced, but the basic conclusion remains the 
same. The practical policy implications of this equation are the following ones: 
-  Pollution intensive production. If production is the main source of the environmental 
problem and if the home country is an importer of pollution-intensive goods, then it 
should use an import tariff. This reduces the world market price for the pollution-intensive 
good and, therefore, reduces foreign production of these goods. If it exports these goods, it 
should subsidise its exports for the same reason. 
-  Pollution-intensive consumption. If consumption (or downstream use) of traded 
commodities is the major source of the environmental problem, policy implications are 
different. If the country is the importer of the pollution-intensive consumption good, it 
should subsidise imports. This raises the world market price and thus has a negative effect 
on foreign demand. If it exports this good, it should tax exports in order to raise the price 
and reduce foreign consumption. 
One should mention that this type of environmental policy is only second best from  a 
global perspective. The first-best solution is to use environmental policies and abandon trade 
interventions. If an agreement on the first best is impossible, then the use of tariffs plus 
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national  Pigouvian  tax  policies  creates  two  distortions. First, since each country 
internalises only domestic externalities and neglects the transfrontier effects of its emissions, 
there is an international prisoners' dilemma in environmental regulation. Second, since 
countries use trade taxes, the price system is distorted. 
As a fourth argument in favour of trade interventions, the sanction argument is often 
used. Trade restrictions might be used to enforce international environmental agreements by 
punishing non-compliants. A problem with sanctions is that they are often not credible since 
they do not only harm the non-compliant but also the country that imposes them. The leakage 
argument, however, shows that trade interventions can be in the genuine interest  of the 
country implementing them. Assume that the country under consideration becomes an 
importer of environmentally intensively produced good when it signs the agreement. An 
import restriction would have two effects: it would improve its terms of trade and it would be 
the appropriate instrument to cope with pollution leakage. Thus, trade restrictions would be 
credible. In contrast, consider a country importing goods that are environmentally harmful 
when consumed or used in downstream production processes. A trade restriction would have 
a positive effect on the terms of trade but would obviously aggravate the leakage problem. 
Thus, in such a situation, the use of trade restrictions might not be credible. 
 
2  Imperfect Competition, International Trade, and the Environment  
A major innovation in international trade theory in the 1980s was the consideration of 
imperfect competition. This has been surveyed by Helpman (1984), Helpman/Krugman 
(1985,1989), Kierzkowski (1987), Krugman (1988a), Vousden (1990, chs. 5-7) and by 
Krugman (1995). Models involving imperfect competition can explain phenomena that have 
been left unexplained by the traditional trade theories based on perfect competition and 
additional assumptions à la Ricardo or à la Heckscher-Ohlin. An example is intra-industry 
trade, i.e. trade in similar commodities amongst similar countries. Moreover, some of these 
models have arrived at policy implications contradicting those derived from earlier models.  
Besides the consideration of non-competitive  markets, the new trade theory models 
left the general-equilibrium framework that had been the standard tool of trade theory before.  
Instead of looking at interdependent factor and goods markets, one looks at partial equilibria 
and market interactions and income effects of policy changes are neglected. Finally, the new 
trade theory is quite eclectic. There is no unified framework like the many-countries, many-
goods, many-factors version of the Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardo models but a collection of 
rather diverse models that often do not have much in common. The environmental-economics 
literature has taken a similar direction and has incorporated models and tools of modern 
microeconomic theory in general and of industrial organisation in particular like those 
discussed in Tirole (1988). I will present three type of modelling frameworks, the monopoly, 
the oligopoly, and the monopolistic competition model. 
 
2.1  The monopoly case 
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The introduction of monopoly into the environmental  economics  literature  is  due  to 
Buchanan (1969). This paper shows that the use of emission taxes may lead to welfare losses. 
The monopolist supplies less than the optimal quantity and the supply is reduced by even 
more by stricter environmental policies. The improvement of environmental quality can be 
offset by a loss of consumer surplus. This is a typical second-best result. There are two 
distortions, the environmental externality and the non-competitive market structure, and they 
would require two policy instruments. If the appropriate instrument to increase the output of 
the monopolist firm (e.g. a subsidy) is not available, the second-best emission tax will be 
biased downwards to raise the monopolist's supply.  
Second-best considerations of this kind are also relevant if a monopolist is involved in 
foreign trade or competes against foreign suppliers in the domestic market.  
•  Investigating the use of tariffs in the case of a foreign monopolist supplying a domestic 
market, Brander/Spencer (1984) argued that a tariff might also serve the purpose of 
shifting some of the monopolist's profits back to the home country. Environmental 
policies use instruments that can be used as a substitute for the tariff and, therefore, may 
serve the same purpose. Rauscher (1997, 163-166) shows that an environmental 
consumption tax exceeding the marginal environmental damage to can be used shift 
profits from a foreign monopolist to the domestic economy. Moreover, the optimal tax 
rate contains a term addressing transfrontier pollution generated by production activities 
of the firm abroad if this is a relevant problem. The latter component can be positive or 
negative depending on the technology used by the foreign firm. The first component of the 
optimal tax rate is a hidden tariff usd for shifting profits to the home country like in 
Brander/Spencer (1984). 
•  A domestic monopolist selling in the foreign market only should be regulated by 
Pigouvian taxes, that internalise environmental externalities. This can be explained by the 
fact that the monopolist exploits only foreigners, whose interests are not represented in the 
domestic government's objective function. See Rauscher (1997, 167-168). If the firm sells 
in the home market as well, environmental taxes should be relaxed since the Buchanan 
(1969) argument applies.  
•  In the case of  an import-competing monopolist, Buchanan's (1969) argument applies 
again. The behaviour of a monopolist with a competitive fringe does not differ in a 
substantial way from that of a monopolist without a fringe. The marginal revenue exceeds 
the price, domestic consumers are exploited (probably to a lesser extent than without the 
presence of a fringe) and the environmental policy is used to correct this externality. 
 
2.2 International Oligopoly and Strategic Environmental Policy: The Nash-Cornot 
Model 
Strategic trade policy in general and export subsidisation in particular have been central 
issues of the trade-policy debate since the mid 1980s. Strategic trade policy seemed to provide 
strong arguments in favour of trade interventions and industrial policy supporting the neo-
mercantilist view that exports are good (and imports are bad). Moreover, it seemed to offer 
explanations for the success of the Japanese economy after the second world war, which has 
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often  been  attributed  to  an  active  government  policy of export promotion. The original 
model of export subsidisation had been developed by Brander/Spencer (1985). They use a 
partial-equilibrium model in which two firms, a domestic and a foreign one, compete in a 
third country's market. The competition is of the Nash-Cournot type. It is shown that export 
subsidies given by the home government can induce an increase in domestic profits which is 
larger than the subsidy. The explanation is that subsidies provide incentives to increase output 
and this shifts the Nash-Cournot equilibrium to the Stackelberg point where the firm enjoys 
the benefits of market leadership. Two caveats must be mentioned in respect to this policy. 
First, the policy recommendations of the theoretical model are not necessarily applicable to 
the real world. The Brander/Spencer model is based on a number of particular assumptions 
(e.g. Cournot instead of Bernard competition, perfect knowledge, no retaliation by the foreign 
government, etc.) and the results turn out to be sensitive to changes in these assumptions. See 
Grossman (1987) and Brander (1995). The second problem is that export subsidies are 
considered as a practice of unfair trade by other countries and they may have an incentive to 
retaliate by using countervailing duties. Alternative policy instruments may be more useful if 
they help to disguise strategic export subsidisation. One possibility is public funding of ex-
port-related research and development. Spencer/Brander (1983) show that this policy leads to 
similar conclusions as a direct subsidy. Another possibility is to disguise subsidies by giving 
them in terms of lax pollution abatement requirements. This reduces production cost and has 
an effect similar to direct subsidisation. This strategic environmental policy has been 
considered by Ulph (1992), Conrad (1993, 1996), Barrett (1994), and Kennedy (1994). Ulph 
(1997a,b) provides for a survey on the subject.  
A very clear and accessible exposition of the strategic environmental  policy argument 
has been presented by Barrett (1994). His model is extended here by the consideration of 
transfrontier pollution. For similar approaches see David Ulph (1994) and Rauscher (1997, 
181-186).  Assume that a domestic and a foreign firm compete in a third country's market. 
This assumption is made (i) to concentrate on export-related subsidisation and (ii) to simplify 
the analysis by disregarding consumer surplus.6 In the first stage of the game, governments 
set the emission targets. Afterwards the firms decide on their outputs. Assuming subgame 
perfection, the game is solved in the usual backward fashion. Profits are 
  ) , ( - ) * , (   = E q c q q q p π , (6) 
 ) . (6*)  * , * ( * - *   ) * , ( * = E q c q q q p Π
p(q,q*) and p(q,q*) are inverse-demand functions, i.e. the prices of domestic and foreign 
goods, p and p*, depend on the output levels, q and q*. As a special case, one may assume 
that the domestic and the foreign goods are perfect substitutes and that their prices are 
identical.  E and E* are the levels of environmental regulation at home and abroad, 
                         
6   For models in which the third-country assumption is relaxed, see Conrad (1993, 1996) 
and Kennedy (1994). 
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respectively.7 The cost functions c(.,.) and  c*(.,.) are increasing and non-concave in 
quantities and decreasing in emissions.  
The first-order conditions for an optimum are  
  0 -   = + q q c p q p , (7) 
  0 * - * * * * * = + q q c p q p . (7*) 
Marginal revenues equal marginal costs. Assume that the second-order conditions are 
satisfied, i.e. pqq<0 and p*q*q*<0. The comparative-static results are obtained by application 
of Cramer's rule to 






























As usual, we assume that the cross derivatives of the profit functions are negative and the 
determinant of the matrix on the left-hand side, ∆, is positive. Then, the reaction functions, 
 and   are negatively sloped in the (q,q*) space and that the domestic 
firm's reaction curve is steeper than the foreign firm's curve. This is depicted in Figure 6. See 
Dixit (1986) for a comprehensive discussion of the properties of the Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium, N, is the point of intersection of the reaction curves, R and 
R*. Moreover, the domestic and foreign firm's iso-profit curves are depicted in this diagram. 
Everything else being equal, a firm would be better off if its rival reduced its output. The 
shaded area depicts the potential of profit increases that can be achieved by cooperation, i.e. 
cartelisation. . If the domestic firm were the Stackelberg leader, it could attain point S where it 
maximises its profits for a given reaction function of the foreign firm. In the simple 
Brander/Spencer (1985) model, this is achieved by export subsidisation.  As an alternative to 
direct subsidies, the government can support its firm by low abatement requirements. Changes 
in environmental policy affect the location of the reaction curve. Laxer environmental 
standards induce an outward shift: for any given output of the rival, the firm's output is 
increased. This is shown for the home country by the by the dashed line.  
) *, ( = E q R q ) * , ( = * E q R q
As a reference case, a situation is considered in which the government does not behave 
strategically. It does not take account of the possibility of shifting profits to the domestic 
supplier from abroad. The impact of domestic environmental policy on foreign output is 
disregarded. The domestic firm is treated like a monopolist selling in the foreign market only 
and it has been argued in the preceding section that the optimal regulation in this case is a 
Pigouvian tax, i.e. t=dE or t*=d*E* .  If both countries coordinated their environmental 
policies and used very strict standards this would lead to an increase in profits :producers 
would reduce their outputs and profits could be increased at the expense of consumer surplus 
in the third country.  
 
-------- insert figure   6  about here 
                         
7   A problem with these environmental standards is that they are firm-specific. Other firms 
that discharge the same pollutant but are operating in other industries without 
oligopolistic market structure.  
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Let us now introduce strategic aspects in environmental policy making. The domestic 
government's objective is to maximise domestic profits minus environmental damage, 
π(q,q*,E)-d(E,E*). Differentiation with respect to E  and the use of the firm's first-order 













* * − − = − = . (9) 
The emission tax rate or shadow price of the environmental resource equals the 
marginal abatement cost () E c − . On the right-hand side, there are three terms. The first one is 
the domestic environmental damage. The second term is a rent-shifting effect. Laxer environ-
mental standards reduce foreign output and this raises domestic profits. Rents are shifted from 
abroad to the domestic firm. The rent-shifting effect reduces the optimal emission tax rate. 
Finally, there may be a leakage effect. Since tighter domestic environmental standards induce 
an expansion of foreign output, the foreign firm may have incentives to increase its emissions. 
This is possible, if the foreign environmental policy uses an output-related emission standard, 
i.e. if dE*/dq* is constant, or if the foreign emission tax rate is given.8 The home country is 
hurt by this if there is transfrontier pollution. The leakage effect, thus, implies a further 
reduction of the emission tax rate. The same three effects can be derived for the foreign 
country. The conclusion is that strategic use of environmental policy in oligopolistic markets 
leads to ecological dumping: emission taxes are lower than marginal environmental damage.  
It can be shown that such a strategic emission tax in general does not establish 
Stackelberg leadership. If transfrontier pollution is negligible, the equilibrium is located 
between the Nash and the Stackelberg points in Figure 6. The underlying reason is that, unlike 
an output subsidy, a modification of environmental policy generates an additional distortion: 
the marginal social cost of pollution exceeds the marginal benefit to the firm if the tax rate is 
reduced to a level lower than the Pigouvian tax rate. See Barrett (1994), Rauscher (1997, 
185), and Walz/Wellisch (1997). Thus, the relaxation of environmental policy is only second 
best compared to a direct export subsidy. If the input of a factor of production (e.g. an 
environmental resource) is subsidised to promote exports, a deadweight loss has to be taken 
into account compared to a situation where the correct instrument (an export subsidy) is 
chosen. The marginal deadweight loss is increasing with the rate of subsidization and, 
therefore, the welfare maximum is attained at a lower level of exports. Thus, the Nash 
equilibrium with strategic choice of emission taxes is located between N and S in figure 6.5, 
for instance in point E. If leakage effects are substantial, then the new Nash equilibrium is 
moved further to the right, possibly even beyond the Stackelberg point, depending on the 
strength of the leakage effect. 
                         
8   If the foreign emission tax rate is given, then this implies that  * *E c  is given. Total 
differentiation of this and the foreign firm's first-order condition with respect to output 
then gives the results that foreign output and emissions are increased if the domestic firm 
reduces its output. 
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It should be noted that the policy  recommendation  of  laxer  environmental 
standards than in the competitive case depends on the assumptions made in this model 
framework and, unfortunately, changes in the assumptions may lead to drastically different 
results. 
One first problem here is retaliation. Just as the home government supports its firm by 
means of lax environmental standards, the foreign government can also use environmental 
policy strategically. This may result in a rat race where each country responds to lower 
emission taxes abroad by reducing its own emission taxes. Each government responds to a 
reduction in foreign emission taxes by relaxing its own environmental policy. The shapes of 
the reaction functions in this game amongst the governments are indeterminate in the general 
case; it is, however, plausible that their slopes are negative and that an equilibrium with 
positive tax rates exists. Nonetheless, these taxes are too low and at least one country is worse 
off compared to a situation in which each country does not behave strategically but only 
internalises the externalities created by its own firm.  
 
2.3  Strategic Environmental Policy: Variations and Extensions 
The basic model of strategic environmental policy has been extended and modified in various 
respects. As the original Brander/Spencer model has turned out to produce results that are 
highly sensitive to variation in the underlying assumptions of the model, the policy 
implications derived from the Nash-Cournot model discussed in the preceding section are 
rather unstable. See also Grossman (1986) and Brander (1995) for surveys of the critique of 
the Brander/Spencer model. We will look at several extensions and variations of the basic 
model. 
•  Price competition. Oligopolists do not always choose quantities as their strategic 
variables. If the commodities that they produce are only loose substitutes, it may be more 
realistic to assume price competition à la Bertrand.  Eaton/Grossman (1986) have shown 
that the policy implications derived from the Nash-Cournot model are reversed if prices 
instead of quantities are used as strategic variables. This conclusion carries over to the 
environmental-policy model as has been shown by Barrett (1994). Let q(p,p*) and 
q*(p,p*) denote the demand functions for the domestic and the foreign good, respectively, 
having the conventional properties. Domestic profits are 
  ()( ) ( E p p q c p p pq , * , * , − = ) π  (10) 
The first-order condition is derived by maximisation with respect to the price, p. The same 
is done by the foreign firm, and the comparative statics are determined by 
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If the profit functions are strictly concave  in prices, if the cross derivatives of the profit 
function are negative and if the determinant of the matrix on the left-hand side of the 
equation is positive, which is the standard case, then the reaction functions are positively 
sloped in the (p,p*) space,9 the domestic firm's reaction curve is steeper than the foreign 
firm's curve and a tighter environmental standard leads to an outward shift of the domestic 
curve. As a result, both prices increase. It is possible to show that firms benefit from 
rivals' price increases. It follows that a policy which raises prices is beneficial to both 













* * − − = − = π . (12) 
Again, there are three terms, the marginal environmental damage, the strategic aspect, and 
the leakage effect. The strategic component is positive: lower domestic emissions induce 
foreign price increases and this is beneficial to the domestic firm. The sign of the third 
component, the leakage effect, is indeterminate. Thus, if the transfrontier pollution 
problem is negligible, the optimal policy is to tighten environmental standards and taxes 
beyond the Pigouvian level. The underlying reason is that the use of prices as strategic 
variables generates too much competition, and the intensity of competition can be 
mitigated by policies that increase production costs such as strict environmental standards. 
•  More than two firms. The number of firms is also a decisive variable. If there is more than 
one domestic firm, then cartelisation is beneficial. Like in the competitive model, the 
potential market power of the export industry can be brought into effect by higher 
emission taxes. This reduces domestic output and, thus, induces cartel-like bahaviour. See 
Barrett (1994). Basically, this is a terms-of-trade argument. The terms-of-trade 
improvement must be weighed against the profit-shifting motive, and the policy im-
plications become unclear.  
•  Domestic consumers have been neglected in this model since it has been assumed that the 
output is exported to a third country. If consumer surplus is taken into account, then some 
of the result change. In the Bertrand price competition model, a tight environmental policy 
raises prices and causes losses of consumer surplus. This mitigates or reverses the policy 
implications. In the Cournot model, the effects are unclear since the change in 
environmental policy moves the domestic and the foreign supplies into opposite 
directions: laxer taxes and standards raise domestic supply and reduce foreign production. 
If the home-market effect dominates (as it does under realistic parameter constellations) 
this provides an additional incentive to relax environmental standards. See Conrad (1996) 
and Kennedy (1994) for models that take account of the demand side. Kennedy considers 
an intra-industry trade model of the Brander (1981) type with two identical countries and 
                         
9   Or, using the terminology of Bulow/Geanakopolos/Klemperer (1985), prices are strategic 
complements. 
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n>1 firms in each country. Although n  may be large, terms-of-trade effects do 
not occur: net exports are zero since the countries are identical. 
•  Retaliation. If the home country relaxes environmental standards to shift rents from 
abroad into the domestic economy, the foreign country can retaliate. In the symmetric 
case, both countries are worse off in an equilibrium with environmental-policy 
competition than without. See Rauscher (1997, 185-186) and Walz/Wellisch (1997). The 
underlying reason is that both countries relax environmental policies, outputs rise, and 
prices decline. This benefits consumers in the third country but harms producers and the 
environment in the exporting countries. If countries are asymmetric, then it is possible that 
one of the countries is better of with relaxed environmental policies even though the other 
country retaliates.  
•  Trade liberalisation. Walz/Wellisch (1997) consider the effects of trade liberalisation in a 
slightly modified Nash-Cournot model. Their  interpret trade liberalisation as a reduction 
of  instrument set of the policy maker. Tariffs and other trade interventions become 
unavailable after liberalisation. In the case of strategic trade policy,  the first-best 
instrument, an export subsidy, is abandoned when a free-trade agreement is signed, and 
the second-best instrument, the environmental policy has to be used. In a first step, this 
leads to laxer environmental standards in both countries: trade liberalisation as defined by 
Walz/Wellisch harms the environment. However, trade liberalisation increases welfare. 
The underlying reason is that compared to the export-subsidy, the emission tax is more 
costly to use due to additional distortions. Thus, in the Nash equilibrium the use of 
environmental policies generates less competition amongst governments than the use of 
export subsidies. Thus,  restricting the instrument set available to the policy maker turns 
out to be beneficial in the resulting Nash equilibrium. As a caveat, one may add that this 
result requires some degree of symmetry of the two countries. It does not necessarily 
generalise to the case of asymmetric countries. 
•  Strategic behaviour of firms. In the standard model producers just vary prices or 
quantities. Additional variables are often available, however. Ulph (1992), for instance, 
considers a model where firms choose outputs after having decided on their capital stocks. 
He shows that governments have incentives to use environmental standards rather than 
taxes. This is explained by the fact that a government by setting such a standard 
precommits the level of its domestic producer such that the other producer is discouraged 
to behave strategically.  This model is extended by a more general formulation of the 
technology and by the consideration of domestic consumption in Ulph (1996b). There, it 
is shown that this result may be reversed. Taxes may Pareto-dominate standards. 
However, the resulting Nash equilibrium is a prisoners' dilemma. Both countries would be 
better off, had standards been chosen instead of taxes. In a similar paper, where strategic 
behaviour of producers is modelled by investing in research and development, Ulph 
(1996a) shows that strategic behaviour of firms reduces the incentive for governments to 
relax their environmental policies. This can be explained by the fact that firms can at least 
partially precommit themselves to higher outputs by using their strategic variable in an 
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earlier stage of the game. This implies  that the government intervention can be 
smoother. Moreover, he shows that distortions in environmental policy and research and 
development are larger in the case of taxes than in the case of standards. Like in  the other 
paper, both countries are better off with standards than with emission taxes.   
•  Innovation, competitiveness, and strategic environmental policy. Tighter environmental 
standards and taxes may induce research and development towards new environmentally 
friendly technologies and products.  This has been modelled by David Ulph (1994) for the 
case of process innovation and by Rauscher (1997,193-201) for the case of product 
innovation. Both papers arrive at the conclusion that even though the oligopolists bahave 
according to the Cournot conjecture there exists a possibility that optimal environmental 
policies over-internalise environmental externalities. The critical parameter is the shape of 
the R&D success function. If tight emission standards or taxes induce substantial research 
and development, then one should employ strict policies. A generalisation of the model is 
investigated by Ulph/Ulph (1996), where environmental research and development and 
normal process research and development are analysed jointly and the results derived by 
Ulph (1994) are confirmed. Similar results are reported by Rauscher (1997, 1993-207), 
who looks at product standards.. Tighter environmental product standards may serve as a 
precommitment device to gain a larger share of the high-quality product market. This 
works if the major cost component is the research and development but not the production 
cost of the environmentally friendlier product. Using similar models as the two mentioned 
here, Reitzes (1992) and Motta/Thisse (1993) come to unambiguous conclusions 
regarding strategic environmental policies. These models, however, are based on rather 
idiosyncratic specifications of demand and cost functions that rule out many otherwise 
possible scenarios.  
•  General equilibrium. Rauscher (1994a) embeds a strategic-trade-policy model into a 
general-equilibrium framework. It is shown that even with a Cournot-Nash specification 
of the oligopolistic industry the emission tax rate may be higher than the Pigouvian tax 
rate. This is to be explained by general-equilibrium repercussions in a multi-sector model 
involving non-tradable commodities.   
On the whole, these extensions show that strategic environmental policies applied to 
oligopolistic industries arrive at rather ambiguous or even contradictory results. In some 
cases, environmental policy should be relaxed, in others, they should be tightened. If the 
policy reccmmendation is a tightening of environmental standards, can this be interpreted as a 
theoretical foundation of the Porter (1991) hypothesis that strict environmental policy is good 
for competitiveness? In some cases it can, in others not. In the Bertrand-competition scenario, 
strict environmental policies are advisable. However, not because the improve competitive-
ness. Rather on the contrary, in the Bertrand case, there is too much competition and the 
government raises welfare by reducing competitiveness of its producer. This can be seen from 
the fact, that the foreign firm gains from the introduction of stricter domestic standards. 
Matters are different in the case of environmental innovation. Tighter standards may serve as 
a precommitment device that induce firms to credibly engage in research and development 
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towards new abatement technologies or new  products. However, the results are ambiguous 
and depend on the parameters of the model. Therefore, a general Porterian policy conclusion 
cannot be drawn. 
 
2.4  Monopolistic competition and intra-industry trade 
About half of the global commodity trade is intra-industry trade, i.e. trade in similar 
commodities and among similar countries. This trade cannot be explained by theories that are 
based on differences between countries and commodities. Moreover, an explanation of this 
phenomenon on the basis of partial-equilibrium oligopolistic models à la Brander (1981) or 
Brander/Krugman (1983) seems to be implausible. The standard models of intra-industry 
trade now look at general equilibria. It is assumed that there are increasing eturns to scale, 
free market entry, and, therfore, monopolistic competition like in Chamberlin (1933). There 
are basically two modelling approaches to intra-industry trade:10 the love-of-variety approach 
developed by Krugman (1979,1980) and Dixit/Norman (1980) based on the Spence (1976) 
and Dixit/Stiglitz (1977) models of monopolistic competition, (2) the specific-preferences 
approach by Lancaster (1980), and Helpman (1981) based on Hotelling's (1929) model of 
spatial competition. These models have only rarely been used in environmental economics, 
probably because they are difficult to handle. An exception is Rauscher (1997, 201-212). The 
approach is love-of-variety. 
There is a differentiated commodity with potentially infinitely many varieties. Only a 
finite number of varieties is actually produced, n in the home country and n*  abroad. For 
simplicity, assume that the demand sides of the two countries are identical.  All commodities 
are produced with the same technology and they are equally desirable from the point of view 
of the consumers. Consumers like variety and their love of diversity is introduced via a 
particular utility function, which is composed of identical sub-utility functions for each 
variety:  




i N q q q u ∑ = =
where qi is the quantity consumed of commodity i, N is the number of commodities available 
and  is a preference parameter, 0< θ θ <1. (1-θ )
-1 is the elasticity of substitution between two 
of these commodities expressed in absolute terms. It makes sense to assume that substitution 
possibilities for consumers are improved if the number of goods is raised, i.e. 0 ) ( ' > N θ . 
Based on these assumptions, one can  derive demand functions for all commodities like in 
Dixit/Stiglitz (1977) such that   where  φ  is a parameter which is taken as given by 
1 − =
θ
i i p φ q
                         
10  See also Greenaway/Milner (1986, chs. 2-3) for an overview. 
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the firms.11  All  domestic  producers  are  identical in all respects except in the designs 
of their products. Thus, we can drop the subscript i for the price. Output is a concave function 
F (. , .) of variable capital Ki and emissions Ei having positive partial derivatives, negative 
second partial derivatives, and a positive cross partial derivative. A third input is not 
considered for the sake of convenience.The rental rate of capital, r, is taken as given by each 
firm. Increasing returns to scale are introduced by assuming some fixed capital K0 which has 
to be installed before any production can take place. Thus, a representative firm maximises 
) ( ) , ( 0 K K r E K pF i i + − = π  with respect to Ki  . The first-order condition is that of a 
monopolist in the goods market. There is a mark-up over marginal cost, which depends on the 
price elasticity of demand. Moreover, free market entry guarantees that profits are zero in 
equilibrium. Finally, it is assumed that the total capital stock of the economy, K, is fixed. 
Given that the foreign economy is of the dame monopolistically competitive type with the 
same consumer preferences, the equilibrium in the two economies is characterised by: 
( − K F F K θ
) ( 0 K K n i +
* * * F F K −θ
* * ( * 0 K K n i +
 0 ) 0 = + K i , (14) 
   , K =  (15) 
 ) * * ( 0 K K i +  , 0 =  (14*) 
 )   * K =  (15*) 
The first of these equations characterises the competitive monopolist on the supply side. It is 
derived from the zero-profit and the first-order condition. The marginal product is larger than 
the average product. The second equation represents the factor-market equilibrium: the 
number of firms times the capital demand per firm is the supply of capital. The other two 
equations state this for the foreign country. Interestingly, these for equations determine the 
equilibria of the economies in autarky and with free trade. In the latter case, additional 
conditions are needed to determine the terms of trade but this is not considered here. 
Consider first a move from autarky to free trade. If the demand parameter, θ,  is 
constant, not much happens: the supply side remains unchanged but intra-industry trade is 
generated because consumers demand additional variety. Foreign goods are demanded by 
domestic consumers and domestic goods are demanded by foreigners. See Krugman (1980). If 
θ is increasing in the number of goods, i.e. if demand for each individual variety becomes 
more elastic as the number of varieties is increased, then there will be a concentration process 
and some of the n+n* firms will have to leave the market. If the environmental regulation 
aims at keeping the emissions of the whole industry constant, then environmental quality 
remains unchanged. If the regulation is such that emissions per firm are fixed, then the 
reduction of the number of firms has a positive effect on the environment. Thus, the gains 
                         
11  This is not an innocent assumption as  Hejidra/Yang (1993) and Yang /Hejidra (1993) 
have shown.. The main conclusions to be drawn from the model, however, are not 
affected by this simplification 
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from trade have three components: increased  variety,  lower  prices  and  better 
environmental quality. However, if consumption is environmentally harmful as well. Finally, 
if the environmental policy instrument is an emission tax and the emission tax rate is constant, 
then the pollution level tends to increase since the total output of the industry increases. See 
Rauscher (1997, 207). Finally, the aggregate consumption level increases (concentration 
reduces the fixed-costs share in the economy and this rises aggregate output).  
The effects of trade policy in open economies in the monopolistic-competition trade 
model have been explored only to a limited extent. Work by Lancaster (1984) and Gros 
(1987a,b) on the effects of trade policy in intra-industry trade models suggests that 
environmental policies tend to have terms-of-trade effects even for the small country case. 
This can be explained by the fact that each country, even a small one, enjoys monopolistic 
market power in its export market since each variety is produced by only one firm/country. 
From this, one may conjecture that strict environmental policies always have positive terms-
of-trade effects since they raise the relative prices of the exported goods. Thus, welfare-
maximising countries should tax emissions at higher than the Pigouvian rates. This would be 
the opposite of ecological dumping. 
Leakage effects can have unexpected signs in the intra-industry trade model. See 
Gürtzgen/Rauscher (2000). Tighter environmental policies in the home country have two 
effects on competitive monopolists. On the one hand, they are cost-increasing and, therefore, 
tend to induce exit of existing firms. There is a countervailing effect, however. Tighter 
environmental standards raise marginal cost and this implies that, for a given mark-up factor, 
the monopolist charges a higher prices. This price effect has a positive impact on profits and 
this may induce new producers to enter the industry. The resulting net change in industry 
structure is ambiguous. Depending on the parameters of the production and cost functions, 
there will be entry or exit on the domestic supply side. If there is exit, then the number of 
varieties is reduced, the price elasticity of demand rises, foreign profits rise, and new 
producers enter the foreign industry. This leads to an increase in foreign emissions. Matters 
are different, if strict environmental standards induce additional entry into the domestic 
industry. The price elasticity is reduced, foreign profits shrink and foreign firms leave the 
industry. This causes an improvement in environmental quality. It is, thus seen, that the 
endogeneity of market structure in the intra-industry trade model can produce new and 
unexpected effects such as a unconventional leakage effect where emissions abroad are 
reduced after te introduction of stricter environmental policies at home. 
On the whole, it seems that the potential of the monopolistic-competition model of 
international trade for the analysis of trade policies in open economies still remains to be 
explored. The fruitfullness of employing this tool has been shown in the recent economic-
geography literature, e.g. in Fujita/Krugman/Venables (1999), and I think that comparable 
progress is possible n the area of environmental economics. 
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3  Political  Economy  and  the  Environmental Policy in Open Economies  
Most of the theoretical literature in environmental and international economics is concerned 
with normative issues: what should a benevolent government do to maximise  social welfare? 
A much smaller part of  the literature addresses the question why these  why these measures 
are not taken. In the area of international economics, this has resulted in a substantial body of 
literature dealing with the political economy of protectionism. See Mayer (1984), Hillman 
(1989), Magee/Brock/Young (1989), and Grossman/Helpman (1994). Environmental 
economics, in contrast, has been orientated much more to normative questions. Exceptions are 
Buchanan/Tullock (1975),  Pashigian (1985), Hahn (1989), Aidt (1998). Different approaches 
to model the political decision making process are possible. On the one hand, there is the 
median-voter model predicting that a majority decision will nit represent the average voter's 
but the median voter's will. This model can be used to analyse majority decisions in direct 
democracies. On the other hand, there are lobbying models that analyse political processes in 
representative democracies. 
Only recently has modern public choice theory been applied to issues of international 
trade and the environment. The main contributions are Oates/Schwab (1988),   
Hillman/Ursprung (1992, 1994), Hoekman/Leidy (1992), Leidy/Hoekman (1994), Fredriksson 
(1997, 1999), Rauscher (1997, Ch. 7), and Schleich (1999). The main objective of this 
literature is to show in which direction the outcome of the political process is likely to deviate 
from what is being regarded as optimal by welfare theorists. In particular, it is interesting to 
address the issue of ecological dumping: given that benevolent governments have only limited 
incentives to engage in ecological dumping, can too-lax environmental standards be explained 
by the particularities of the political process of environmental-policy formation in open 
economies? Another issue is the use of environmental regulation as an instrument of 
disguised protection.  
Three approaches to analyse the process of economic and environmental policy 
formation have been used in the literature. The first one is the median voter model, which is 
applicable in direct democracies, where the voter herself decides on the issues. This approach 
has been used by Oates/Schwab (1988) in a model of interjurisdictional competition with 
mobile factors of production. This model is not really related to international trade and will, 
therefore, be discussed in the next section. The second approach is based on the idea of an 
incumbent government which is subject to regulatory capture by powerful lobbies. 
Traditionally, this has been modelled by using the concept of the political-support function, 
that has been introduced into the literature by Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976). This 
concept has been considered as being ad hoc until it has been given a behavioural foundation 
by Coughlin/Mueller/Murrell (1990) and, particularly, Grossman/Helman (1994), who used 
game-theoretical concepts from the theory of menue auctions developed by 
Bernheim/Whinston (1986) to show that political-support functions can be derived from the 
interactions of lobbies and an incumbent government. The third approach is based on electoral 
competition influenced by lobbying activities. In this theory, there are competing candidates 
rather than a single government, and the  probability to win the election depends on campaign 
contributions provided by lobbies representing idiosyncratic interests. The latter two 
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approaches  have  their  shortcomings,  but  they  are currently the best and most consistent 
theories available.12  
Fredriksson (1997) looks at environmental policies inopen economies using a model 
based on the Grossman/Helpman (1994) approach. There are two goods, a clean and a dirty 
one, and two lobbies, the environmentalists and the unions and "industrialists". Utility 
functions are quasilinear such that this model, although being, general equilibrium can is 
equivalent to a partial equilibrium model.  Workers and industrialists are interested in con-
sumption only whereas environmentalists have environmental quality as an additional 
argument of their utility function.  The marginal environmental damage is constant. Environ-
mentalists and workers have wage income and a share of redistributed emission taxes and 
industrialists have profits as an additional income source. The emission tax rate in the 
political equilibrium depends on the power of the environmentalists and the industrialists. 
Workers are assumed not to form an active lobby (which is a rather unrealistic assumption). 
Assume that the tax elasticity of pollution is negative and constant. Then, the green lobby 
obviously has a positive impact on the tax rate. With increased political influence of the 
greens, the recognition of their interests in the political process rises and this has a positive 
impact on environmental taxes. Industrialists influence the tax rate into the opposite direction. 
The underlying reason is that the wage rate is constant and that the industrialists receive a 
sector specific factor reward that is inversely related to the emission tax rate. Given these 
assumptions, the result that emission taxes are increasing in environmentalists' influence and 
decreasing in industrial interests is intuitive and plausible. 
Additional - and less straightforward - insights are gained if the world market price 
changes. It is shown that in the general case where some of the individuals in society are 
workers and do not lobby, the emission tax rate is declining in the world market price. The 
intuition behind this result is that the industrialists' incentive to lobby is increasing in the 
world market price of the pollution-intensive good. If all individuals are members of lobbies, 
then the tax rate equals marginal environmental damage, which is constant.  Of course an in-
creasing world market price leads to an additional incentive to increase output and, therefore, 
pollution. If the emission  tax is reduced, this effect is reinforced.  
Even more surprising results turn up when the tax elasticity of emissions is not 
constant. Then the redistribution of the tax revenue becomes a decisive explaining variable 
for  the characterisation of the political equilibrium. An increase in green lobbying may under 
extreme circumstance have a negative impact on the tax rate. The reason is that the greens do 
not only benefit from better environmental quality but also from an increase in the tax 
revenue. Thus, if emission taxes reduce the tax revenue drastically, the environmentalist 
group may be interested in lower taxes. Similar reasoning applies to the impact of the 
industrialist lobby.  In a final step, Frederiksson introduces abatement subsidies as a second, 
exogenous instrument and shows that higher abatement subsidies may lead to more pollution. 
The abatement subsidy may induce an output increase and, thus, the industrialists' specific 
                         
12  Austen-Smith (1991) has questioned the microfoundation of the contest success function 
of the electoral-competition model, and the Grossman/Helpman (1994) model is based on 
the idea of en enforceable contract between policy makers and idiosyncratic interest 
groups.  
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factor income which makes them increase  their campaign contributions and gain more 
influence.  
A similar model with two goods and five policy instruments has been analysed by 
Rauscher (1997, Ch. 7). The lobbies are modelled slightly differently, i.e. the greens are 
interested in the environment only and the industrialists only consider their specific-factor 
income. Domestic and foreign goods are imperfect substitutes and cause environmental 
damage both by being produced and by being consumed. The policy instruments are 
environmental product standards, consumption taxes, and a domestic tax on emissions from 
production. The model is solved by maximising a political-support function. If only one 
policy instrument is available, then the lobby impact is as expected. The greens support 
measures to clean up the environment, the industrialists those that protect their rents. Green 
interests and industry interests converge when foreign polluters are regulated by special 
product standards and tariffs. Environmental protection and conventional protectionism share 
forces. Some counter-intuitive results are derived for a situation where environmental policy 
as a whole, i.e. the whole set of environmental policy instruments, is subject to lobbying 
activities. Interestingly, the industry lobby has a positive impact on environmental production  
taxes. The reason is that the emission tax has two effects on specific-factor income. The first 
one is negative: higher production taxes lead to a decline in demand and, therefore, in income 
of the specific factor. The second one, however, is positive. Higher emission taxes lead to 
substitution of pollution-intensive technologies by specific-factor intensive technologies. The 
second effect influences the emission tax rate, to cope with the first effect, the sector-specific 
factor lobbies for a reduction in consumption taxes. Moreover, for similar reasons, the impact 
of industry lobbies on domestic environmental product standards is positive. 
Particularly, the results derived for the impact of the industry-specific factor are 
counter-intuitive and perhaps also counter-factual. They are based on the assumption that the 
government acts completely rationally and always uses the most efficient instrument to 
provide protection to the interest group. Owners of pollution abatement capital are supported 
by product design standards and production taxes. Owners of usual production capital are 
subsidised by means of low consumption taxes but not by means of any other instruments 
since their use would cause greater income losses to the general public than subsidisation. 
This looks counter-intuitive and even counter-factual. However, the theoretical model does 
not predict that industry lobbies are interested in tight standards and taxes but that tight 
standards and taxes are what they get as a outcome of the political process. Thus, the observed 
lobbying activities are not a genuine test of such a model.  
Schleich (1999) shows that with more than one policy instrument available, it is 
possible that the increase in specific-factor lobbying power does not necessarily lead to laxer 
environmental standards. A rational government may find it optimal to serve this lobby by 
other instruments such as import tariffs 
The impact of trade liberalisation on the political equilibrium is investigated by 
Frederiksson (1999). In the presence of trade distortions the socially optimal emission tax rate 
deviates from the Pigouvian tax rate. The tariff leads to more-than-optimal polluting 
production in the economy and this is corrected by a particularly high tax rate. Of course, this 
tax rate should be reduced of trade is liberalised. Matters are different in a lobbying 
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equilibrium. If the reduction of the tariff has  a  contracting  impact  on  the  polluting 
industry, then both the incentives of the environmentalists and of the specific factor to pend 
resources on lobbying are reduced. The resulting effect on the political equilibrium is 
ambiguous and depends on the parametes of the model. The polarisation of green and 
industrialist lobbies measured by the difference in the intensities of lobbying efforts.  
A completely different approach to modelling the political process in a trade-and-
environment framework is chosen by Hillman/Ursprung (1994). They neither employ the 
simple political-support-function approach nor the incumbent government model introduced 
by Grossman/Helpman (1994). Instead they look at a two-country model, where in each 
country there are two parties or candidates who compete in a election and their probability of 
success depends on campaign contributions made by different lobbies.  Without environ-
mental concerns, i.e. if only industrialists lobby, then the two candidates announce extreme 
policies. There is political polarisation. The liberal candidates announces free trade and the 
protectionist candidate announce a prohibitive tariff. In a next step, green lobbying is 
introduced. Green interest groups are interested in free trade if production is the source of 
environmental disruption and if they do not care about environmental quality abroad. 
Otherwise, i.e. if consumption is environmentally damaging or if environmentalists care about 
pollution in the rest of the world, they favour protectionist policies. It is then shown, that 
environmentalist lobbying does not affect the outcome of the political process: the 
polarisation equilibrium is maintained. As an alternative policy instrument, Hillman/Ursprung 
(1994) analyse voluntary export restraints. With this instrument, the political platforms of the 
two candidates converge. The reason is that foreign firms support the liberal candidate but 
foreign firms derive benefits from voluntary export restraints. Thus the liberal candidate can 
increase her election probability by offering trade protection through voluntary export 
restraints. This convergence equilibrium can be unstable if environmentalist interests are 
introduced. If externalities are generated by production activities and environmental damages 
are substantial. Then the convergence equilibrium in voluntary export restraints vanishes. 
Two new equilibria arise, a first one where the parties converge to a liberal trade policy and a 
second one where the parties diverge towards free trade and autarky positions, respectively. 
On the whole, the literature on the political economy of environmental policy in open 
economies is still in its infancy. The Grossman/Helpman (1994) approach has provided useful 
tools for the investigation of political-economy issues. It has been established that 
environmentalists often have common cause with protectionist interests expressed by owners 
of sector-specific factors. Moreover, both groups often have a genuine interest in  the 
regulation of foreign suppliers.  However, may questions are still open and unresolved. One 
aspect is the use of environmental taxes and standards as  a non-tariff barrier to discriminate 
against foreign producers. Environmental protection and environmental protectionism, using 
the environmental concern only as a pretext to disguise harmful barriers to trade, are difficult 
to disentangle (Saunders, 1992). An argument behind the use of such trade interventions that 
are often rather inefficient is obfuscation. See Magee/Brock/Young (1989, ch. 18). The 
political support a policy maker acquires does not only depend on the gains and losses that 
accrue to different groups in society but also on the visibility of these gains and losses. From 
the point of view of the policy maker, inefficient policy instruments may be useful if they 
allow to hide the costs of distortive policies. For this purpose, environmental quality standards 
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and technological product standards may  much  more useful than price instruments like 
taxes and tariffs, that make the costs and benefits of a policy measurable and, thus, more 
obvious. A behavioural model of obfuscation using results from information economics is still 
missing.  See also Rodrik (1994) on this point.  
 
4  International Factor Movements and the Environment 
Environmental policies in open economies are affected not only by international trade in final 
goods but also by international factor movements. In particular, the international mobility of 
capital has been increased substantially in the 1980s and 1990s. It has been argued that this 
leads to "environmental capital flight" to pollution havens and, if governments respond to this 
by relaxing environmental standards, to a race towards the bottom in environmental 
regulation. This section looks at what has been achieved in the theoretical literature that has 
applied models of international factor mobility to environmental economics. A survey on the 
race-towards-the bottom hypothesis can be found in Wilson (1996) and Oates's (1998) survey 
article on interjurisdictional competition. Nonetheless, I wish to start at an earlier stage and 
look at what determines international factor movements in the presence of environmental 
externalities. 
The analytical framework of most of this section is the standard model of international 
factor mobility developed by Jasay (1960), MacDougall (1960), and Kemp (1964, ch. 13) and 
surveyed by Ruffin (1984). This model produces results that are closely related to those 
derived in the Heckscher-Ohlin trade framework, that has been the subject of section 1 of this 
paper. The similarities arise from the fact that international trade and factor movements are 
substitutes in this framework under standard conditions including perfect competition and 
absence of market interventions. See Markusen (1983) and Wong (1986).  The environment 
as an additional variable has been introduced into the model by Merrifield (1988) and 
Baumol/Oates (1988, Ch. 17), and Oates/Schwab (1988). Merrifield (1998) considers 
international trade and factor movements in a common framework, which is possible since he 
has more than two factors in his model. Thus his results are a combination of those presented 
in this section and in the first section of this article. For extensions of these models see Wang 
(1995) and Rauscher (1997, Ch. 3). Later on, the world of perfect competition will be left and 
non-competitive market structures will be introduced.  
 
4.1 International Capital Movements and Environmental Regulation under Perfect 
Competition 
We follow Oates/Schwab (1988) in assuming a world consisting of at least two countries or 
jurisdictions using capital, labour, and environmental resources as factors of production. 
Capital and labour are the fixed factors of production, environmental resources are available 
in variable supply where the supply is determined by the government's environmental policy. 
There is a single commodity which can be traded internationally. Trade is necessary to 
remunerate internationally mobile factors of production or - loosely speaking - to repatriate 
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profits. The production function, F(K,L,E),  is  constant-returns-to-scale, increasing and 
concave in all arguments, and the cross derivatives are negative as it has been specified in the 
introduction. Environmental damages are generated by the use of resources in the production 
process and the environment is a public consumption good. Environmental externalities 
caused by consumption and externalities affecting factor productivities are not modelled 
explicitly but will be mentioned. The remuneration of the factors of  production is determined 
by their marginal productivities, i.e. FK=r, FL=w, and FE=t, where r, w and t  denote the 
factor rewards. The welfare of the home country is determined by its output minus the factor 
reward going to foreign factor owners who have invested in the home country minus the 
environmental damage, which depends on domestic and foreign emissions: 
  () () ( ) * , , , 0 E E D K K r E L K F w − − − = , (16) 
where K0 denotes the original capital endowment of this economy. 
 
----- insert Figure 7 about here 
 
Capital moves from countries with a low marginal productivity of capital to the 
country with a higher productivity. Thus, capital movements may depend on differences in 
technology or on the availability of the other factors. Since we want to look at differences I 
environmental regulation assume that everything else is equal. This is depicted in Figure 7, 
where the total capital endowment of the home country and the rest of the world (indicated by 
the asterisk) is on the horizontal  axis and capital remuneration is measured on the vertical 
axis. Starting from a situation in which both countries use the same regulation, one of the 
countries changes its environmental regulation. Its marginal-productivity curve is shifted 
upwards (as shown by the dashed line in Figure 7). This induces a relocation of capital to this 
country as can be seen from the shift of the equilibrium point. If environmental externalities 
on production are small, then this shift is the result of laxer environmental standards. If 
environmental externalities on production are substantial, the upward movement of the 
marginal-productivity curve may be due to a tightening of environmental standards. Thus, 
depending on whether environmental quality is a consumption good or a factor of production, 
tighter environmental standards reduce or increase competitiveness.  As already mentioned in 
section 1, the environmental policy is determined by the natural abundance of environmental 
resources, by the willingness and ability of the citizens to pay for environmental quality, and 
by regulatory and enforcement deficits. 
 
4.2  The Gains from Factor Mobility  
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The removal of barriers to the functioning of markets is usually regarded as being 
beneficial. Thus, barriers to factor mobility should be abolished to increase economic welfare.  
However, this is based on the assumption that there are no other distortions in the economy.  
If the economy is distorted, second-best considerations apply and the removal of a restriction 
may turn out to be harmful to the economy. A typical distortion which is interesting in the 
context of environmental economics is insufficient environmental regulation. Two cases can 
be distinguished. In the first scenario, emissions are fixed, then the only think which happens 
after factor market liberalisation is a movement of the mobile factor to the location where its 
productivity is higher. This is clearly beneficial. Matters are different if the environmental 
policy uses instruments that allow emissions to vary. As an example consider an emission tax. 
The change in the capital stock after factor market liberalisation on domestic emissions is 
0 / > − = EE KE F F dK dE . Emissions and capital are positively related to each other. The 
welfare effect of factor market liberalisation follows from differentiating (16): 






D F r F
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*
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It is seen that there are three effects of liberalisation. The first is positive since K is increased 
if the term in brackets is positive and K is decreased if the term in brackets is negative. This is 
the traditional gain from trade in a factor movements model. The second effect depends on the 
sign of () E E D F − . If the country under consideration attracts capital, then emissions are 
increased and this is beneficial if the additional production exceeds the additional 
environmental damage. This is true if the environmental regulation is too strict and over-
internalises environmental damages. If the environmental regulation is too lax, then the effect 
is negative. Finally, there is a leakage effect. Since capital invested in the home country is 
withdrawn from abroad, dE*/dK<0. A country attracting capital from abroad benefits from 
less transfrontier pollution. A country investing abroad is harmed by additional transfrontier 
pollution.13  
Additional effects have to be considered if consumption causes environmental harm. If 
consumption externalities are insufficiently internalised, then the increase in consumption 
possibilities may be offset by deterioration of environmental quality. 
Like in the case of trade in final goods, one can address the question how 
environmental regulation should be adjusted after a move from autarky or restricted mobility 
to free factor movements. The first one is an income effect. The efficiency gains from 
liberalisation raise the income and this should have a positive impact on the demand for 
environmental quality. In the simple model considered here, however, this effect is excluded 
by assumption since the welfare function is quasilinear. In a richer model, one would observe 
                         
13  This was a fear expressed by US environmentalists before the NAFTA agreement with 
Mexico. It was  argued that pollution-intensive industries would move to the Mexican 
side of the border causing additional transfrontier pollution that would deteriorate 
environmental quality in the US. 
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a shift in the damage function. Marginal  damage would be increased because it is 
taken more seriously by the citizens and this would lead to a reduction of emissions. 
Moreover, there are two opposite productivity effects in the capital-importing and in the 
capital-exporting countries. In the capital-exporting country, the marginal productivity of 
emissions would be reduced and this implies that emissions should be reduced. The reduction 
of emissions can be achieved by a higher emission tax rate. In the capital-importing country, 
the marginal productivity of emissions is raised. It now exceeds the marginal damage and this 
implies that more pollution is desirable. Emissions should be raised and emission tax rates 
reduced. The aggregate effect of factor mobility on emissions  is ambiguous in the capital-
importing country and negative in the exporting country. Interpreting the exporting countries 
as industrialised countries and the importing countries as the importing countries, one would 
identify a environmental benefit in the industrialised countries and ambiguous effects on the 
environment in the Third World.  
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4.3  Environmental Policy in Open Economies  and  Interjurisdictional 
Competition 
In a small open economy without additional distortions, the optimal environmental policy 
equalises marginal costs and marginal benefits. The emission tax rate should equal the 
marginal environmental damage. There is no race towards the bottom. Matters are different if 
distortions are introduced. To make matters simpler assume initially that all jurisdictions are 
identical. This is an assumption often made in the theory of interjurisdictional competition 
and fiscal federalism. See Zodrow/Mieszkowski (1986), but also Wilson (1986, 1987), and 
Wildasin (1988), for example. The assumption leads to the result that factors do not move 
internationally because there are no factor productivity differentials that can be exploited. Ex 
ante, however, policy makers consider the possibility to influence the factor allocation by 
their actions and this drives the results. 
Some of the results derived in the following sections have been derived by 
Oates/Schwab (1988), Rauscher (1997, Ch. 3), and Wilson (1997). They will be presented in 
a common simplified framework and extended in various respects.   
 
4.3.1 The Small Open Economy with Factor Market Distortions 
As standard distortion considered in the fiscal-federalism literature is a source tax. Let its rate 
be γ  and let the tax revenue be redistributed in a lump-sum fashion. Such a situation has been 
considered by Oates/Schwab (1988, 341-345) and Wilson (1997, 407-408). The factor 
demand equation is changed such that  γ + = r FK . Producers who employ capital have to pay 
the world market rate of interest plus the tax rate. Welfare maximisation yields the optimum 




D F t E E γ − = = . (18) 
where  dK/dE follows from total differentiation of the factor demand equation. dK/dE is 
positive in the standard  case and negative if there are substantial externalities affecting factor 
productivities. The latter case is not considered here but it can be investigated easily by just 
turning the arguments around. The optimal emission tax rate has two components. The first 
one is the marginal environmental damage. The second one is a tax-base effect. Since capital 
is a part of the tax base, governments wish to attract capital by laxer environmental standards. 
The Nash equilibrium in which all governments choose such a policy leads to a prisoners' 
dilemma in which all countries are worse off compared to a situation with Pigouvian taxes. 
The underlying problem is a fiscal externality known from the tax-competition. By taking 
actions to increase its own tax base, a government reduces the foreign tax base. This negative 
externality is not taken into account and the consequence is a prisoners' dilemma. The 
competition for a mobile tax base leads to less-than-optimal supply of public goods. For an 
example from the tax-competition literature see Zodrow/Mieszkowski (1986). Of course, the 
dilemma is due to a restriction on the set of policy instruments: if the capital tax rate could be 
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chosen freely, then its optimal value would  be zero, the fiscal externality would vanish, 
and the emission tax would equal marginal environmental damage. See Wilson (1997, 409-
410).  
An variation and extension of this model is considered by Kanbur/Keen/van 
Wijnbergen (1995), who take country size into account. A large country hosts many firms, a 
small country only a few. By reducing its environmental standards, the small country attracts 
many foreign firms which generate a tax revenue which is by assumption larger than the 
increase in the environmental damage. This net gain is partially offset by the increase in 
emissions by domestic producers who are only a small number, however. The large country, 
in contrast, can attract only few firms from abroad and the corresponding net benefit is, 
therefore, small. The costs of this policy are high, however. Since there are many domestic 
producers, the pollution level is increased substantially. Thus, everything else being equal, 
small countries should be expected to have laxer environmental standards than large ones.  
Like before, this is a second-best result based on the existence of a distortion generated by the 
tax system. 
Another distortion could be created by the use of particular environmental policy 
instruments that generate rents which are appropriated by the private sector. Using the 
command-and-control approach, the government does not collect a tax revenue and the 
scarcity rent of environmental resources is appropriated by the private sector. As long as this 
does not affect the factor allocation, this is of not much interest. If, however, this rent 
becomes part of the factor income of the mobile factor, then this policy instrument becomes 
distorting. This distortion has been discovered by Sinn (1994) and Wellisch (1995). The 
resource scarcity rent  going to the mobile factor is just a subsidisation of the use of this 
factor. Thus, we have a kind of reversed fiscal externality. Since the use of the mobile factor 
is indirectly subsidised, capital is not a tax base but a subsidy base and, by analogy, the 
objective is to drive capital out of the country. If this can be done by tight environmental 
standards, then the resulting Nash equilibrium is characterised by too-strict environmental 
policies.14  
A third decision involves majority voting. Assume that there are workers and other 
individuals earning no wage income. Moreover, assume that the tax revenue is devided 
between the workes and non-workers such that each group receives a constant share σ. 
Oates/Schwab (1988, 346-348) show that the workers then prefer a negative tax on capital, 
i.e. a subsidy. The reason is that they share the burden of paying the cost of attracting capital 
with the rest of the population but they do not share the benefit that they receive in terms of 





D F t E E σγ − = = . (18) 
                         
14 For algebraic proofs see Wellisch (1995) and Rauscher (1997, 81-84). Krumm/Wellisch 
(1995) derive this result in a more general setting where producers and countries are 
diverse.   
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Since γ is now negative, the tax rate is higher  than  in  an  undistorted  economy.  The 
underlying reason is the same as before. There is a fiscal externality which leads to a 
deviation of the second-best policy from the first-best policy.  If the non-wage earners are the 
majority, they will determine the policy in a direct democracy. The objective of the non-wage 
earners is different from that of the workers. They maximise capital-tax  revenue minus 
environmental damage. The optimal tax rate for them is positive. They are interested in 




DE σγ = . (20) 
The marginal environmental damage should equal the marginal fiscal gains that the non-wage 
earners derive from an increase in emissions. Whether this tax rate is too high or too low than 
the first-best emission tax rate depends on the shape of the production function and the non-
wage earners' share in the total population. 
In a next step, I wish to consider labour market distortions. The most important labour 
market distortions in the 1980s and 1990s was involuntary unemployment, at least in Europe 
and many developing countries. There are many theories offering explanations for 
unemployment,  but I want to keep it simple and consider a minimum wage as a binding 
restriction in the process of wage formation. In such a situation the wage rate is higher than 
the opportunity cost of time, which is the marginal utility of leisure, v'(-L). Algebraically, 
.  Extending the welfare function by a leisure term, yields   ' v w FL > =
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) * , , , 0 E E D L v K K r E K L F wL − − + − − =  (21) 
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The environmental policy is less restrictive than in the case of no unemployment. 
Since the distortion, a rigid wage, cannot be overcome, a second-best approach is chosen. 
There is now a benefit from reducing the tax rate below the Pigouvian tax rate because this 
increases employment and reduces the welfare cost of unemployment. The unemployment 
correction term in (22), ()   however, occurs independently of whether capital is 
mobile or not. But dL/dE depends on capital mobility. In the case of mobile capital, the effect 
of a reduction in environmental stringency has two effects whereas it has only one in autarky. 
In autarky, a lax environmental policy increases the marginal product of labour and this leads 
to more employment. In the case of unrestricted factor movements, laxer environmental 
policies attract more capital and the additional capital has an additional impact on labour 
productivity. Thus, the benefit of relaxing environmental regulation is larger in an open 
economy than in autarky.  One can extend this model by introducing taxes on capital line in  
Wilson (1997, 413-414). It can be shown that labour market imperfections aggravate the race 
to the bottom induced by the fiscal externalities arising from taxation of the mobile factor. 
dE dL F v L / '−
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4.3.2  The large-country case 
Until now small open economies have been the subject of the investigation. In the large-
country case, the world market interest rate is not given but can be influenced by the country 
under consideration. r is endogenous.  If there are no market distortions, the capital-market 
equilibrium is determined by  
 *) , * *, ( * ) , , ( 0 0 * E K K K L F r E K L F K K − + = = . (23) 
Both domestic and foreign producers take the world market interest rate as given, and in the 
equilibrium, it equals the marginal product of capital. Assume, moreover, that the home-
country takes the foreign emission tax rate, t*, as given. Note that  E F * * = t . This implies 
that dK/dE>0 and dE*/dE<0.15 A stricter environmental policy at home leads to a reduction of 
the capital stock and to an increase in emissions in the rest of the world. This effect of course 
requires the absence of significant externalities on production. The second effect is a 
"leakage" effect. Stricter environmental policies lead to environmental capital flight. 
Additional capital is employed abroad. This increases the marginal productivity of the 
environmental resource abroad. With a given emission tax rate in the foreign country, the 
incentives to use environmental resources are increased and, thus, foreign emissions tend to 
rise. The world market interest rate now depends on the environmental policy. It can be 
shown that dr/dE>0. Laxer environmental policies raise the marginal productivity of capital in 
the international market (again under the proviso that factor productivities are not reduced by 
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The first component is the marginal environmental damage. The second one is the interest-
rate effect. Tighter environmental policies reduce the marginal productivity of capital and, 
thus, the interest rate in the world capital market. This is good for the home country if it is an 
importer of capital, K>K0, and bad if it is an exporter, K<K0. Thus, everything else being 
equal, the capital-importing country has an interest in a strict environmental policy and the 
capital-exporting country prefers a laxer policy.16 The third effect is the leakage component. 
It is always negative. The reason is that the leakage reduces the benefits from tight 
environmental policies. Since tight environmental policies are costly in terms of reductions in 
domestic output, the emissions will be increased. It would be interesting to consider Nash 
equilibria in environmental policies. However, this leads to ambiguities in the general case 
                         
15  Total differentiation of (21) and the foreign emission tax equation,  * * * E F = t  , yields 
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  and then Cramer’s rule is applied to obtain the comparative-static results. 
16  This is closely related to the terms-of-trade effect of environmental policy in an economy 
trading final goods. Here, this may be called a factor-terms-of-trade effect 
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since third derivatives are involved in the determination of the slopes of reaction 
function. Matters are simpler in the case of identical countries. The interest-rate effect 
vanishes. The remaining components of the emission tax are marginal environmental damage 
and the leakage component. Since the latter is negative, it follows that environmental policies 
do not even internalise the domestic share of the negative environmental externality. Thus, 
emissions in both countries are increased and welfare is reduced. International capital 
mobility aggravates transfrontier pollution problems 
 
4.3.3  Partial equilibrium  models of foreign direct investment and the problem of 
small numbers 
The previous sections have assumed that there are many enterprises and that the mobile can 
be cut into arbitrarily small pieces. This may be realistic from the point of view of a large 
country or the world as a whole. However, many environmentally problematic investments 
are mega-projects that have supra-marginal effects on the economy, both in terms of 
environmental damage and national income. As an example consider a nuclear power station. 
Following the literature, this will be modelled in a partial equilibrium framework, where only 
one sector but not the economy as a whole is taken into account. The presentation is based on 
Rauscher (1995) and Hoel (1997). 
There is a single  potential investor who wishes to build a polluting plant in one of n identical 
jurisdictions. This is a large-scale project involving high fixed costs. Thus, there are 
decreasing returns to scale that generate a kind of natural monopoly. Moreover, since 
transportation costs of the good produced in the plant are sufficiently small, the whole market, 
i.e. all countries or jurisdictions are supplied by the single firm. Total demand is given and the 
firm produces according to the mark-up pricing rule. The price exceeds the marginal cost of 
production and the mark-up depends on the elasticity of demand. Factor demand is less than 
in perfect competition: the marginal value products exceed the prices of the factors of 
production. Increases in emission taxes lead to reductions in emissions and in the demand for 
the other factors of production. Moreover, they have a negative effect on profits. Given the 
high fixed costs, it is possible that profits become negative for a high emission tax rate. This 
emission tax rate is termed t
max.
  As the reference case consider cooperation of the economies. 
An optimal environmental policy maximises the welfare which is total consumer surplus, 
CS+CS*, plus tax revenue, TR, minus environmental damage, Di. In Figure 8, the consumer-
surplus, tax-revenue, and environmental-damage curves are depicted. For later purposes, three 
different damage functions are shown but marginal damage is the same in all cases. The 
optimum is achieved where the slopes of the damage curves equal the slope of the 
CS+CS*+TR curve. In the diagram, this is the case for a tax rate larger  t1 . 
Let us no look at the uncoordinated case where each country decided independently of 
the others whether or not to become the host of the polluting plant. Three parameters 
influence this decision:  
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•  Consumer surplus. If the country decides  to be the host, consumer surpluses accrue 
to all jurisdictions independently of which one is the host. The host country generates a 
positive external effect on the other jurisdictions. 
•  Tax revenue. The tax revenue is collected by the host country. Thus, there is a competition 
for the tax base involving negative fiscal externalities. 
 
•  Environmental damage. In the case of purely local pollution, the host bears the 
environmental cost of the investment. In the case transfrontier pollution, some of this is 
externalised. 
 
Producer surplus is not considered since the investor is a foreign firm. Let us assume in a first 
step that pollution is purely local. Depending on the level of the environmental damage 
function, the following cases can be distinguished:  
 
•  The first scenario corresponds to small environmental damages, D1. The environmental 
cost of hosting the polluter is small. Since it is obvious that someone will host, the each 
jurisdiction will participate in the consumer surplus independently of whether it hosts the 
plant or not. Thus,  consumer surplus becomes irrelevant for the decision. The important 
variable is tax revenue minus environmental damage. As long as this net benefit is 
positive, it is optimal for a country to undercut the emission tax rates of other countries in 
order to attract the foreign investor. This downward tax competition ends when 
, i.e. when the tax rate equals average environmental damage. In the case of 
small damages, the tax rate is likely to be too low as can be seen from Figure 7. 
Ecological objectives of environmental policy are dominated by fiscal considerations. The 
underlying reason is a fiscal externality: one can increase in a country's tax base is 
accompanied by the reduction of the tax base in another country but this effect is 
neglected.  
) (E D tE =
 
•  If the environmental damage is higher, D2 , the countries may end up in a chicken-game 
situation. The tax revenue is less than the damage such that the host is worse off than the 
other countries. Nevertheless, the host is better off than in a situation without an 
investment taking place. All countries are confronted with the same problem and one of 
them is the chicken. The chicken should choose a tax rate which maximises consumer. 
There, however, are multiple equilibria in this game since each country country could be 
the chicken. If the players adopt mixed strategies, it is possible that no jurisdiction offers 
the investor an environmental tax regime with less than the prohibitive tax rate. 
 
•  Finally, if the environmental damage is very large, D2 , there is a prisoners' dilemma: the 
benefits from becoming the host are negative even if the alternative is that the investment 
is not undertaken at all. This scenario has been termed "not in my backyard" (NIMBY). 
 
One can show that this diversity of non-optimal results is the consequence of a 
second-best situation. The first best would be characterised by the availability of a second 
policy instrument, a direct tax or subsidy affecting the investor's behaviour. It can be shown 
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that the first-best environmental tax,  equalling  marginal  damage,  is  charged  if 
such an instrument is introduced into the model. 
Extensions of the model include the consideration of transfrontier pollution, the 
introduction of transportation costs, and alternative market structures with more than one firm 
and endogenous entry and exit. In the case of transfrontier pollution, leakage problems have 
to be considered. Then, the cost of not being the host is not only the loss of tax revenue but 
also the additional transfrontier pollution to be expected if the firm invests abroad. Thus, the 
cost of not being the host is increased compared to a situation with purely local pollution. The 
extreme case is the global-pollutant scenario. The environmental damage of a global pollutant 
is independent of the geographical location of the source of the emission. This translates into 
100 per cent leakage if the investor moves from one jurisdiction to another and this reduces 
the opportunity cost of becoming the host country to zero. If transportation costs are taken 
into account, like in the article by Markusen/Morey/Olewiler (1995), additional patterns of 
localisation become possible. The monopolist may find it profitable to open plants in each 
jurisdiction. If there is more than one firm, the results do not change significantly as long as 
transportation costs are negligible: all producers locate where the emission tax rates are the 
lowest. See Hoel (1997). Matters are different if transportation costs are significant. Then a 
large variety of results become possible. E.g. one possibility is a situation where firms invest 
in different countries and there is intra-industry trade like in the Brander/Krugman (1983) 
model of reciprocal dumping. Moreover, multinational firms, which run plants in various 
countries, enter the arena. Due to the increase in complexity, these models cannot be solved 
analytically any more but require numerical solution methods. See Markusen (1997). 
 
4.4. Green Capital market Interventions 
Like in the case of international trade where tariffs can be motivated for environmental 
reasons, one may think about interventions affecting the allocation of the mobile factor of 
production. Since factor movements may be welfare deteriorating in the presence of 
regulatory or enforcement deficits in environmental policy, restricting factor movements 
ought to be beneficial. This is a second-best result, however, the first best would be to remove 
the original distortion, i.e. to implement the correct environmental policy. Like in the trade 
case, however, interventions may be beneficial in the large country case. Assume that the 
other country has chosen an emission tax rate as its policy instrument. Maximisation of the 
social welfare function yields 
  E D t =  (25) 























− = γ  .  (26) 
The emission tax rate now equals the marginal environmental damage. The tax rate on capital 
consists of two components. The first one addresses the factor terms of trade. See Sinn (1989, 
Ch. 7). It is positive if the country is a capital exporter and negative if it is an importer. This 
can be explained as follows. A high tax on capital increases the supply of this factor in the 
rest of the world. The world market interest rate is reduced and this is good for a country that 
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imports capital. Thus, the importing country  is interested in taxing capital and, by analogy, 
the exporting country subsidises capital. The second term represents the leakage component 
of  capital taxation. It is always negative. Capital is subsidised in order to avoid that 
investments that pollute the domestic environment are made on the other side of the border.  
From the point of view of a single country, this is a first-best policy. From the point of 
view of the world as a whole, such a policy is non-optimal. First, transfrontier pollution 
externalities are not taken into account since the emission tax rate is based on domestic 
externalities only. Second, the allocation of capital is distorted by the capital market 
intervention. A global first-best policy would encompass stricter environmental standards on 
the one hand and undistorted capital movements on the other hand.  
A final question that can be asked is whether two instruments (capital and emission 
taxes) are better than one (emission taxes only) in the uncoordinated-policies scenario. In 
general, the answer is ambiguous: it depends on the parameters of the production and damage 
functions. However, if the countries are sufficiently similar, one can easily show that two 
instruments are indeed better than one. To see this, compare equations (24) and (25). In both 
equations, the factor-terms-of-trade component becomes very small. If in the scenario with 
two instruments, all countries subsidise capital at similar rates the capital market distortion 
becomes very small and vanishes if they are identical. The tax rate then is Pigouvian. In the 
case of the emission tax as the only instrument, this tax is biased by the leakage component 
even if the countries are identical, the level of pollution is higher and welfare is lower.  
 
4.5 Some  Conclusions 
Many of the results derived from the competitive trade models discussed in Section 1 carry 
over to the case of mobile factors of production. This is not surprising since trade in final 
goods and factor movements are substitutes in the standard neoclassical models of the open 
economy. Like in Section 1, a general conclusion as to whether factor market liberalisation is 
good or bad for the environment and for welfare cannot be drawn. Moreover, there is no clear 
answer to the question whether interjurisdictional competition leads to a downward 
competition of environmental regulations. These issues have to be addressed empirically.  
 
5 Intertemporal  Issues 
Most models look at the trade-environment relationship from a purely static or comparative-
static perspective. There are, however, two aspects that cannot are not covered by such 
analyses: intertemporal trade and long-term stock-pollutant effects of emissions. Both aspects 
are important in theory and in practice. First, static theoretical models are usually based on the 
premise that trade is balanced in equilibrium. Empirically, unbalanced trade is, however, the 
rule rather than the exception. Second, many pollutants have long-term effects. Examples are 
radioactive substances, heavy metals but also carbon dioxide and sulphur dioxide emissions. 
In the following two sections, I will present some of the central results in a continuous 
time optimal control framework. The solution method is Pontryagin's maximum principle, and 
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it is presented in Feichtinger/Hartl (1986), Chiang (1992), and Léonard/Van Long 
(1992). Other approaches such as the two-periods model are possible but the main 
conclusions are the same. 
 
5.1  Stock Pollutants and International Trade 
Many emissions do not only affect the well-being of the current generation but also that of 
future generations. This implies that long-term effects of current emissions matter if decisions 
on environmental policy are made. There are several ways of modelling intertemporal impacts 
of emissions. If pollutants are non-degradable, then we have an exhaustible-resources 
problem. The stock of environmental quality is reduced by every unit of the pollutant 
discharged by economic activity and decontamination is not possible. Exhaustible resources 
and trade have been addressed by Siebert (1985b) in the context of the resource-exporting 
country. Pollutants, however, are degradable, albeit often only in the very long run, The 
degradation of environmental pollution and the decontamination of environmental policy can 
be modelled in two different ways. Either one can look at cases where the rate of pollution 
degradation is constant and exogenous. This is appropriate when radioactive substances are 
concerned, that degrade at a constant rate. Alternatively, one can assume that the regeneration 
of environmental quality is stock-dependent. The better environmental quality, the larger is 
the natural rate of decontamination. The underlying reason is that the resilience of ecosystems 
is negatively affected by environmental pollution. Natural recovery is a declining function of 
the necessity of recovery. Formally this is equivalent to the renewable-resources approach 
mostly used to model fisheries and sometimes also forestry problems. For a comprehensive 
overview of such models, see Munro/Scott (1985) and Clark (1990). Let R measure the stock 
of renewable environmental resources (environmental quality) available at time t, the time 
argument being omitted. Moreover, let qi measure the extraction rate. Then the depletion and 
recovery of the resource can be modelled by  
  , (26)  () i q R g R − = &
where g( ) is the regeneration function, which is increasing for low values of R and declining 
for large values. At R
max, the maximum level of environmental quality is attained , i.e. the 
virgin state of nature in the absence of human intervention. MSY is the maximum sustainable 
yield or, applied to the environmental degradation problem, the maximum amount of 
pollutants that can be discharged into the environment without harming environmental quality 
permanently.  See Figure 9. If it is assumed that extraction costs are inversely related to the 
resource stock, then a market equilibrium is characterised by an extraction rate which is an 
increasing function of the stock, e.g. γR, and a long-term equilibrium is attained where the  
regeneration function and the equilibrium locus intersect.  
 
------- insert Figure 9 about here 
 
   50
If interpreted as a renewable resource,  e.g. as the biomass of a particular species, the 
shape of the g( ) represents logistic growth: if the maximum stock of the species is attained, 
there is no further growth because the carrying capacity of the ecosystem for this species is 
attained. If R is interpreted as environmental quality, the unpolluted state of environment is 
denoted by R
max.  At this level, the decontamination rate, measured by the absolute value of 
the slope of the g( ) function in this point, is large. It becomes smaller as R is reduced, i.e. as 
the environment is becoming increasingly polluted. The marginal rate of decontamination 
becomes zero at the maximum of the g( ) function and is negative at lower values of R. The 
average rate of decontamination is reduced as R decreases and becomes zero for R=0: there is 
an irreversibility problem. This line of arguing shows that renewable-resources and stock-
pollutant problems are indeed algebraically equivalent.  
Dynamic optimisation theory has been used to show that in a the simple case without 
stock externalities, the long-term stock of the renewable resource is determined such that the 
marginal rate of regeneration, g', equals the market rate of interest, r. The marginal rates of 
return to all assets must be the same in equilibrium. g'=r  implies that the long-term extraction 
rate is lower than the sustainable yield. The optimum is stable in the saddle-point sense as 
shown by the trajectories depicted in the diagram. The introduction of stock externalities 
shifts the equilibrium to the right and the long-run resource stock is increased. 
 
--------insert Figure 10   about here 
  
Brander/Taylor (1997, 1998) look at the case of open-access renewable resources.17 
Open access implies that the scarcity of the resource is not taken into account. They model a 
renewable resource with a quadratic regeneration function. Thus g( ) is parameterised and has 
a specific shape. Let q1 be the extraction rate. Labour is the only factor of production, its 
supply,  L,  being exogenous and fixed. Like in the Ricardo trade model, the production 
functions are linear and in the resource sector the marginal productivity of labour depends on 
the resource stock: 
  1 1 RL q α =  (27) 
where  α is a constant parameter. To produce one unit of the other commodity, the 
manufactured good, one unit of labour is required. Since this good is chosen to be the 
numéraire, its price equals one and, since thereis perfect competition, the real wage is one as 
well. If labour is mobile across sectors, wage rates must be equal, and the price of the 






1 =  (28) 
Moreover, a Cobb-Douglas utility function u  is assumed such that the price 
elasticity of demand is -1 and the income shares spent on the resource and on the 
ß ßq q − = 1
2 1
                         
17  For a similar model, which is a bit more complex than the Brander/Taylor model , see 
Chichilniski (1994b).  
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manufactured good are ß and (1-ß)  respectively. Given the constancy of the 
income shares, it follows that the supply-demand equilibrium is characterised by the 
extraction rate being a linear function of the resource stock and the labour endowment of the 
economy: 
  LR q αβ = 1 . (29) 
This is represented by the linear function γR in Figure  9.  
Assume that two economies of this type, having different regeneration functions such 
that g( )=ξg*( ) but being identical otherwise, move from autarky to free trade. If ξ > 1, the 
hump-shaped curve in Figure 9 is at a higher level for all R except 0 and R
max and the home 
country has the larger long run resource stock in autarky. If
 each country remains diversified 
after trade liberalisation, the wage rates will adjust to the same levels. There is factor price 
equalisation. Moreover, the long-run resource stocks of the two countries will be the same in 
the long run. This follows from the fact that according to equation (28), the resource stock is 
inversely proportional to the price of the resource, the parameter α being the same in both 
countries. One can then show that the world market price of the resource in the trade 
equilibrium lies between the two autarky prices. From this, it follows directly that resource 
stocks in the trade equilibrium lie between the autarky equilibrium resource stocks of the two 
economies. In other words, the long-run equilibrium resource stock of the resource-rich 
economy has been reduced and the resource stock of the resource-poor country has been 
increased. In Figure 9, the market equilibrium locus, γR , is shifted upwards for the resource-
rich country and downwards for the resource-poor country. It can now easily be shown that 
the resource-poor country is harmed by trade liberalisation. Since its resource stock has 
declined, labour productivity in the resources sector is smaller than in autarky and the 
production possibility set has shrunken. Since the resource stocks of the two countries are 
identical in long-run equilibrium, the labour productivities are identical as well and there is no 
trade anymore in the long run. Thus, the two countries can consume only what they produce. 
Thus, the consumption possibility set of the resource-rich country has shrunken compared to 
the autarky situation and this country is worse off with trade than without. The resource-poor 
economy, in contrast, benefits from free trade. According to Brander/Taylor (1997, 1998), 
this model may be used as an explanation for the observation that resource-rich economies on 
average have been those that have benefited the least from free trade. 
Besides deriving the long-run equilibrium result, Brander/Taylor (1998), investigate 
the transitional dynamics of the model showing that under realistic parameter conditions the 
resource-rich economy is worse off not only in equilibrium but also along the trajectory 
leading to the equilibrium. Moreover, they investigate the effect of trade interventions. Not 
surprisingly, the resource-rich country benefits from the introduction of trade barriers. Of 
course, this is only a second-best policy. The first best, like in the static environment-and-
trade model would be to limit the access to the resource by using policy instruments that 
signal resources scarcity to resource users and then liberalise trade. 
Renewable resources models that start from socially optimal extraction have been 
analysed by Barbier/Rauscher (1994), Rauscher (1994b), and Schulz (1996). These models 
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extend  the  simple  optimal  resource  extraction model by the introduction of a stock 
externality or stock-dependent extraction costs. The long-run equilibrium is then determined 
by  
   (30)  r R c u R g R = − ) , ( ) ( '
where uR  is the marginal utility derived from a larger resource stock. This may be due to an 
improvement in environmental quality or to a reduction in extraction costs. For the sake of 
completeness, c is introduced and denotes consumption. 
Schulz (1996) analyses the effects of trade sanctions implemented by the resource-
importing countries on the extraction behaviour of the exporting country.  It is seen that trade 
sanctions, that result in a reduction of the extractor's producer price, lead to a larger resource 
stock in the longer term as one expects.18 If the marginal utility of the resource stock is 
income dependent, however, then the long-run stock may be damaged by sanctions. The 
reason is that sanctions reduce in come and with less income the demand for environmental 
quality tends to decline. As an extension of the model, Schulz considers the case where the 
resource or species competes for alternative uses of the land such as agriculture or cattle. In 
parts of the literature, it is argued that lower prices for resources such like hardwood from 
tropical rainforests reduce the opportunity cost of  alternative uses of tropical-forest land and 
that, therefore, trade sanctions may actually raise the rate of deforestation. It is shown, that the 
results following from the theoretical model is an ambiguous one. However, if the resource 
extraction yields a positive profit, then sanctions always have the desired effect of 
conservation. If sanctions make the extraction of the resource unprofitable, then land 
conversion that destroys the resource becomes possible. If a more complex model of the 
ecological system, involving two or more species, is considered then the effects of trade 
interventions turn out to be ambiguous. Due to the complexity of species interaction, they 
may have unintended results. The Schulz model is not really a trade model. Trade sanctions or 
restrictions are introduced as exogenous price changes. The same results could be derived for 
closed economies where shifts in demand or the introduction of domestic taxes affect relative 
prices. 
Trade is explicitly considered by Barbier/Rauscher (1994) in the framework of a two-
commodities model. They show that trade sanctions can have a negative impact of the 
resource stock if the resource-exporting country is import-dependent. Lump-sum transfers to 
the resource exporting country relax its balance-of-payments constraint and also tend to 
increase the long-run resource stock. These results are derived for a situation in which trade is 
balanced in each period. It is argued that the results carry over to a borrowing-and-lending 
model, where the balance-of-payments restriction is a binding restriction only in the very long 
run. 
Rauscher (1994b) looks at an even simpler model of resource extraction, where there 
are neither stock externalities nor stock-dependent extraction costs. Moreover, resource-
exporting countries are completely specialised. There are price takers and their balance-of-
                         
18  One can show that this result carries over to the open-access case where resource scarcity 
is not taken into account. 
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trade restriction is binding in each period.  The long-run equilibrium is determined by 
g'=r. It is now interesting to consider the transitional dynamics under the assumption of 
perfect foresight of all market participants. If import demand elasticities of the resource-
exporting and importing countries are sufficiently large, the adjustment path is a stable saddle 
path. If however, the Marshall-Lerner condition is not satisfied, i.e. if the sum of the absolute 
values of the demand elasticities is less than one, then the system becomes unstable. In this 
case, the resource stock and the extraction rate go to zero in the long run. Interestingly, the 
initial extraction rate is indeterminate in this model.19  It is then shown that the import 
restrictions tend to make demand more inelastic and, thus, aggravate the problem of 
exhaustion. Export taxes used by the resource exporting country can stabilise the resource. As 
a caveat, it should be mentioned that the assumption of balanced trade I each period is 
certainly restrictive. 
 
5.2  Intertemporal Trade and the Environment 
If trade is not balanced, countries incur foreign debts or positive foreign-assets positions. It 
has been argued in the policy-oriented literature that foreign indebtedness increases pressure 
on environmental resources, and that the debt and the environmental crises in developing 
countries are closely related. See Adams (1991) and Miller (1991), for example.20 To start, 
look at a simple model of foreign debt and/or asset accumulation based on Bardhan (1967). 
The balance of payments restriction now becomes an intertemporal one. In the long-term, 
foreign debt has to be repaid and the foreign-assets position has to be non-negative. This 
relationship can be represented by a differential equation describing the development of the 
foreign-assets position and a long-term constraint.  Foreign assets or debts are accumulated 
according to 
  () ( ) ∑ = − + =
n
i i i i i
i
i C E L K F p rA A 1 , , & , (31) 
where A denotes the foreign assets stock of the country at time t,   its derivative with respect 
to time, r the world market interest rate and the other variables are denoted as they have been 
defined before. Time indexes or arguments are omitted for notational convenience. The right-
hand-side of the equation represents the per-period trade-balance surplus or deficit. Assume 
that the country under consideration is small: relative prices are given and constant. The 
intertemporal constraint is 
A &
 .  (32)  0 ) ( lim ≥ ∞ → t A t
                         
19  In an economic geography context, Krugnan (1991) has derived a simliar result: self-
fulfilling expectations determine the starting point of the path. Unlike in Krugman's 
model, the externality producing Rauscher's (1994b) result is a purely pecuniary one.  
20  Hansen (1989), however, has argued that the opposite may be the case, too. If high levels 
of debt induce balance-of-payment problems, indebted countries may find it difficult to  
import foreign equipment necessary to expand resource-depleting industries such as 
tropical forestry.  
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The objective is to maximise the present  value  of  future  utility, 
  , (33)  (dt E E C C u e n
t ∫
∞ −
0 1 * , , ,...., δ )
where δ is the exogenous rate of discount. Moreover, we need that factor inputs add up to 
total factor supplies, which are also given and constant. From application of Pontryagin's 
maximum principle, we get that the shadow price of foreign assets, λ, equals marginal utility 
and grows at a rate equalling the difference of the international interest rate and the discount 
rate:  
 
i C i u p = λ , (34) 
  ( )λ δ λ r − = & . (35) 
From the first condition, one can infer that relative prices equal marginal utilities. The second 
equation states that the shadow price is not constant over time. It declines if the interest rate is 
larger than the time preference rate. Given that the shadow price is proportional to marginal 
utilities, it follows that consumption tends to rise if the time preference rate is small and it 
tend to grow if δ is large: if the future is heavily discounted, then saving does not pay and 
present consumption is larger than future consumption.  
Moreover, one can derive optimality conditions for factor utilisation. The marginal 
value products of the private factors of production should be equal across sectors and the 
emission tax rate should equal the marginal environmental damage. The latter follows from 
 
i E E u f = λ , (36) 
The foreign-assets position does not enter the conditions that determine factor and goods 
prices, at least not explicitly. This is a case of Fisher's separation theorem, which states that 
with perfect capital markets production decisions are independent of savings decisions.21 
Nonetheless, the foreign debt can have an impact on environmental regulation. The initial 
debt and the initial consumption vector are closely related to each other. The higher the debt, 
the larger is the savings rate needed to satisfy the intertemporal constraint, i.e. the lower the 
consumable income along the economy's development trajectory.22 If the marginal 
environmental damage is an increasing function of income, i.e. if people become increasingly 
aware of environmental problems as their incomes rise, then there is an impact of foreign debt 
on emission taxes and thus on environmental quality. Environmental damage is increasing in 
foreign debt. To show this, I simplify the model such that there is only one good. Then, the 
index  i  vanishes and trade is purely intertemporal. From (34) and (36) it follows that 
, i.e. marginal resource productivity equals marginal environmental 
damage, and this implies 
0 = + E E C u F u
                         
21  See Fisher (1930)  for the basic argument and Siebert (1985a, Ch. 4) for an application to 
exhaustible resources problems.  
22  This can be shown by simple phase diagram techniques for the one good case and the 
argument generalises to the many-goods case.  
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The sign of dC/dE   depends on the cross derivative of the utility function, ucE . This is 
negative for many utility functions, but not  in general. Usually, dC/dE is negative, i.e. a high 
level of consumption is accompanied by low emissions and vice versa. According to (35), 
depending on the sizes of r and δ, the economy will grow at a positive or a negative rate. The 
growth path is a saddle path in the (A,C) or in the (A,E) diagrams. Wrong initial levels of C 
and E  lead to either long-run over-saving or to violation of the intertemporal budget 
constraint. The following graphical representation  is based on no growth, i.e.  δ = r , but this 
can be generalised. The equilibrium is determined by  . Moreover, it follows from the 
first-order optimality conditions that c and E remain constant along the optimal path. Then, 
the   line in the (A,E) phase space is the long-run equilibrium and E is determined by A
0 = A &
0 = A &
0 






E / 0 −
− = . (38) 
With the usual parameters, this is negative, i.e. pollution is aggravated by foreign debt.  
  Various extensions of this basic model can be found in the literature: 
 
•  In Rauscher (1997, ch. 8) it is assumed that the interest rate is increasing in the level of 
the debt. The underlying reason is that highly indebted countries pay a risk premium. This 
increases their debt burden and the incentive to use environmental resources intensively. 
Strand (1994) models the risk problem explicitly and comes to the same conclusion. 
 
•  The intertemporal aspect of natural resource use can be introduced. For the case of 
exhaustible resources, see Siebert (1985), for the case of renewable resources Rauscher 
(1990) . If the resource stock is not an argument in the utility function and if the rate of 
interest is constant, the resource extraction path is not affected by the foreign debt. This is 
a direct implication of Fisher's separation theorem. Otherwise, with the assumption that 
either the interest rate is increasing in the foreign debt or that the resource stock is an 
argument in the utility function, the conclusions derived from the analysis carried out 
above carry over to renewable and non-renewable resources. If the both the interest rate is 
debt-dependent and utility is derived from the stock of the resource, then matters are more 
complex since the resource extraction path may be unstable or cyclical. See Rauscher 
(1990) and Feichtinger/Novak (1991). 
 
Policy implications have been analysed by Strand (1994) and Rauscher (1997, ch 8). 
Given that foreign debt leads to an aggravation of environmental problems, an unconditioned 
debt relief has a positive impact on environmental quality.  From the point of view of the 
creditor country, however, the costs of the debt relief will in most cases be higher than the 
benefit, the creditor derives from the improvement of the environmental quality in the 
indebted country. This has led to the introdcution of debt-for-nature swaps. The indebted 
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country is given a debt relief in exchange for  the  promise  to  use  a  specified  part  of  its 
resource base, e.g. a tropical rain forest, in a more sustainable way. This can be in the interest 
of both countries and a Pareto improvement can be achieved. In general, this instrument is not 
first best, however. From the point of view of the of the foreign conservationist, it may be 
optimal to vary the compensation payment over time. A one-time debt-for-nature swap can be 
too inflexible to achieve the objective. Further Pareto improvements are possible if more 
flexible types of side payments. 
  
6  The Empirical Evidence 
Cropper/Oates (1992) in their survey on the state of environmental economics argue that the 
impact of environmental regulation on international trade is weak to insignificant. Similar 
conclusions are drawn by  Ugelow (1982) and Dean (1992). Here we will go into the details 
of the this literature to some extent to establish a differentiated picture of the 
interdependencies of trade and the environment.  
A major problem of the empirical assessment of the relationship between trade and the 
environment is the measurement of the environmental variables. Two approaches are 
possible. The first one is to look at particular industries and particular pollutants, i.e. to carry 
out case studies. The second one is to be chosen if  the purpose is to draw a more general 
picture. Then, an index of environmental pollution or of the stringency of environmental 
regulation needs to be constructed. Of course, the researcher has some discretion here what to 
include and what to omit when developing such an index. List/Co (2000), for instance, use 
four different measures of environmental stringency in their empirical study on the location of 
pollution-intensive industries in the US and find that some of these  measures are not 
correlated at all. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that  careful sensitivity studies 
should be undertaken and different measures should be used if they are available.  
 
6.1  Environmental regulation and competitiveness 
Microeconomic theory postulates that strict environmental policies reduce factor 
productivities and, therefore, are harmful to the international competitiveness of regulated 
firms. In constrast, the Porter hypothesis claims the opposite.  
The empirical evidence is mixed. Some productivity studies have established that 
environmental regulation can have significant effects on production costs and factor 
productivities and that the signs are in accord with standard microeconomic theory. Examples 
are  Barbera/McConnell (1986), Conrad/Morrison (1989) and Gray/Shadbegian (1993). 
Brännlund/Färe/Grosskopf (1998), using data from the Swedish pulp and paper industry, find 
only limited evidence that environmental regulation has an impct of firm profitability. 
Scholz/Staehler (1999) examine the German titanium dioxide industry  and the Swedish pulp 
and paper industry and find no support off the Porter hypothesis. In the titanium-dioxide case 
study, an increase in innovation activity was observable after the implementation of tighter 
environmental standards, but the potential competitive advantage was eroded quickly by the 
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public-good character of the innovations. In  the  Swedish  example,  a  first-mover 
advantage was observable but this did not improve competitiveness measured by revealed-
comparative-advantage numbers. An interesting result, supporting the Porter hypothesis, has 
been obtained by Bioern/Golombek/Raknerud (1998). They look at a panel data set of 
Norwegian firms from three different environmentally intensive industries and find that non-
regulated firms have a higher probability for exiting the market than regulated firms. This 
suggests that there are cases where the impact of  environmental stringency on 
competitiveness is counter-intuitive. This study suggests that there may be some truth in the 
X-inefficiency explanation of the Porter hypothesis. 
 
6.2  The impact of environmental regulation on the international division of labour 
Given that the evidence at the firm and sectoral level is mixed, it is not surprising that most 
empirical studies did not find significant evidence in favour of an impact of environmental 
regulation on the international division of labour and on the patterns of trade. First-generation 
studies addressing this issue, used on Leontief´s (1954) approach based on input-output 
analysis. Using data for a particular year and a particular country, one computes the factor 
content of exports and imports. This has been done by Walter (1973), who uses US data on 
pollution abatement costs to calculate "overall environmental-control loadings", i.e. the ratio 
of environmental-control cost, including those of the intermediate inputs, to the final price of 
the output. Using these shares, one can determine the abatement-cost content of US trade. 
Walter (1973) shows that the abatement-cost content of US exports is slightly higher than that 
of US imports. This suggests that the US are exporting environmentally intensively produed 
goods and should, therefore, be well-endowed with environmental resources. A shortcoming 
of the approach is the construction of the environmental  cost components of  US imports. It is 
estimated on the basis of US data - a procedure which is correct only if the trading partners 
use the same technologies and the same factor intensities as the US. This is a deficiency not 
only of this but also of the other studies published in the seventies. See Ugelow (1982) for a 
survey. 23 
A similar approach is chosen by Robison (1988). The study is done for several years in 
the 1970s and 1980s and the abatement costs that are implicit in the capital stock used in the 
production process are taken into account. Because of tighter environmental standards, the 
abatement-cost contents of output, exports and imports have risen from 1973 to 1982. The 
change in the abatement-cost content of imports turns out to be larger than that of exports and 
output. This suggests that there has been a shift in US imports from goods with relatively low 
abatement requirements towards goods subject to relatively tough regulation. Or in other 
words: domestic production of environmentally harmful goods has been substituted for by 
imports from abroad. This is in accordance with predictions of trade theory. However, this is 
plausible only if foreign environmental standards remained unchanged or were changed by 
                         
23   For some more recent results using this method for Korean data, see Kim (1990). In this 
study, no significant difference between the pollution contents of imports and exports is 
found. 
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less than US standards. Due to a lack of  foreign data on abatement costs, this is not 
tested by Robison.   
Different results are reported by Sorsa (1994), who uses more recent data.  This study 
considers trade flows in environmentally intensive goods and environmental expenditures in 
seven industrialised  countries. It is shown that for most countries changes in exports in 
environmentally intensive goods and changes in environmental expenditures were 
uncorrelated, the exception being Austria being with a positive correlation. During the period 
1970-1990, comparative advantages have not changed substantially despite the significant 
changes in environmental regulation during this period. Only Japan has experienced a drastic 
reduction in its environmentally intensive exports. Austria and Finland, in contrast, have be-
come slightly more competitive in environmentally intensive products. The Japanese result 
reflects the drastic tightening of environmental standards in this country in the 1970s and 
1980s. The lack of evidence in the other countries is a result of a rather simultaneous move 
towards tighter environmental standards in the industrialised countries. 
Three conceptional shortcomings are intrinsic to the Leontief approach. The first one, 
which has already been mentioned, is that pollution abatement data are taken into account 
only for the country (or countries) under consideration but not for the trading partners. The 
second one is that the analysis is only bivariate. Trade data and intensity data are used but 
endowment data are not considered. Thus, the results reported in these studies are useful as a 
description of the evolution of the patterns of trade, but they do not constitute genuine tests of 
Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory. Thirdly, other variables that influence trade patterns, e.g. 
wages, are neglected.  
Tobey (1989, 1990) has overcome these problems. His study is the first attempt to test 
the predictions of Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory applied to environmental issues. A problem 
here is the measurement of the environmental-resources endowment of the countries. Tobey 
uses an index measuring the stringency of pollution control measures based on a 1976 
UNCTAD survey.24 The trade data used are only those of the pollution-intensive sectors. 
They are identified on the basis of 1977 US data. Net exports of these goods are regressed on 
the factor endowments of different countries in 1975.  The environmental-policy variable is 
insignificant for all five industries under consideration. This result is confirmed by an 
omitted-variables test.25 Tobey argues that this insignificance result does not necessarily 
prove that environmental regulation does not affect international trade. Heckscher-Ohlin trade 
theory assumes perfect mobility of factors of production across sectors. This is realistic only 
in the long run. So changes in environmental policy cannot be expected to have short-term 
impacts on the patterns of trade. To take account of this, Tobey also regressed changes in net 
exports on the stringency of environmental policy and finds a significant impact only for one 
                         
24 This survey resulted in a partition of countries into seven categories ranging from 
"tolerant" to "strict". Tobey (1990) quantified this variable by assigning the values 1 to 7. 
For a detailed description of the data, see Walter/Ugelow (1979). 
25 The omitted-variables test looks at the residuals of a regression in which the 
environmental-endowment variable is omitted. If it is a relevant variable, it should be 
correlated with the residuals.  
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out of five sectors - albeit with the "wrong" sign. Murrell/Ryterman (1991) come to 
similar results. Using 1975 data, they do not find evidence in favour of the hypothesis that 
environmental policy affects trade. Like in Tobey's study, this result may be explained by the 
choice of 1975 as a base year where strict environmental standards were introduced in many 
industrialised countries but the trade impact, if there was any, occurred only with considerable 
time lags.  
A recent study on environmental regulation and trade has been carried out by Van den 
Bergh/Van Beers (1998). They use a gravity model, where bilateral trade volumes - like 
gravity - depend on size and geographical distance of the countries. This gravity model is 
augmented by factor endowment variables. Several measures to approximate environmental 
stringency are employed. The surprising result is that  strict environmental policies in the 
exporting and in the importing country have a negative impact on net exports commodities. 
The only exception is the impact of the environmental policies in the exporting country on the 
exports of environmentally intensive goods, which is insignificant. This confirms Tobey's 
(1990) findings. The negative impact of environmental regulation in the exporting country  on 
net exports  is straightforward: stringent environmental policies raise production costs and 
negatively affect the exporting (and the import-competing) industries. The importing-country 
effect is surprising. Stricter standards in the importing country should raise rather than reduce 
net exports. Van Beers/van den Bergh (1998) argue that this might be explained by barriers to 
trade that governments introduce in order to protect industries that are harmed by strict 
environmental standards. This hypothesis cannot be tested with the available data, however. 
Summarising the insights gained from the empirical literature on the impact of 
environmental regulation on international trade, one finds that there is only weak evidence 
that environmental regulation affects the patterns of trade. A recent studies that finds some 
evidence, however, produce results that are not in accordance with standard economic theory. 
 
6.3  The Impact of Trade on the Environment 
From an economic-theory point of view, the impact of free trade on the environment is 
ambiguous. Trade theory has traditionally looked at the patterns of specialisation. 
Liberalisation of international goods markets may result in "polluting one's neighbour via 
trade", which can is good for environmental quality in one country and bad in the other.  The 
empirical literature has identified a number of other effects that are usually neglected in 
Heckscher-Ohlin models of international trade. 
Hettige/Lucas/Wheeler (1992) and Lucas/Wheeler/Hettige (1992) find evidence in 
favour of the hypothesis that the pollution intensity of production has grown much more for 
high-growth inward-oriented developing countries than for high-growth outward-oriented 
economies. They explain this by differences in the investment behaviour between industri-
alising countries. Outward-oriented economies tend to expand their labour-intensive 
production, which is relatively clean. Protectionist economies following strategies of import 
substitution, in contrast, develop their capital-intensive dirty industries. So at least for many 
developing countries, free trade appears to be good for the environment.  
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Industrialised  countries  can  be  expected to follow the opposite pattern of 
specialisation after trade liberalisation and the effect of trade on the environment may be 
negative. This issue is taken up by van Bergeijk (1991). He uses a pooled set of data for 
OECD countries data from two years (1980 and 1985). The emissions of three pollutants 
(SO2, CO2, and NOx) are regressed on a set of explanatory variables, including a trade 
variable. van Bergeijk finds negative impacts which are significant for SO2 and NOx and 
insignificant for CO2 . This suggests that openness is good for the environment also for the 
industrialised countries. A possible explanation is that pollution-intensive production might 
have moved to countries that are not in the data set. It is known, however, that most of the 
trade of the OECD countries is within the OECD group. Thus,  positive and negative special-
isation effects should nearly cancel out. Alternatively, one may argue that the efficiency gains 
from trade lead to higher income, which then induces higher demand for environmental 
quality and tougher environmental standards. 
This idea is taken up by Grossman/Krueger (1993) in their analysis of the environ-
mental effects of the North-American Free Trade Association. They find environmental 
Kuznets curve effects and conclude that the gains from NAFTA should drive Mexico towards 
implementation of stricter environmental policies. For many pollutants, the income elasticity 
of the demand for environmental quality appears to be such that higher income reduces 
emissions in the longer term - even though higher income is accompanied by more output.  In 
a more detailed and more sophisticated study, Antweiler/Copeland/Taylor (1998) find strong 
support for this result. They use a panel data set for several countries and look at SO2 
emissions. The impact of trade on the environment is decomposed into three effects: a scale 
effect, a technique effect, and a composition effect. The scale effect is negative: trade 
liberalisation increases output and this leads to more pollution. The technique effect is 
positive: trade liberalisation raises income and part of this income is used to to reduce 
emissions by employing better technologies. Finally, the composition effect is ambiguous: 
trade affects the output mix and this may be good or bad for the environment. It is shown that 
the second effect dominates the other two effects such that the net result is an improvement in 
environmental quality after trade liberalisation. For further evidence of the income 
environmental quality relationship see Pannayotou's (2000) contribution in this volume. 
Further mechanisms by which trade affects the environment are identified by 
Birdsall/Wheeler (1992). They use a pooled cross section for time series for Latin American 
countries and regress the toxic intensity of production on a set of explanatory variables 
including an index of openness. They find that openness leads to cleaner production in these 
countries. Using the Chilean economy as a case study, they look at the economic mechanism 
explaining this relationship. They argue that in this case the reason is the availability of 
modern, new technology developed in industrialised countries to meet strict environmental 
standards. The issue of diffusion of clean technologies is addressed by Wheeler/Martin (1992. 
For the case of the pulp industry, they find that the adaptation lag for the introduction of new, 
clean technologies is significantly raised if countries are inward-oriented.  This supports the 
hypothesis that trade is good for the environment. 
Some studies on the impact of free trade on the environment deal with particular 
markets. Agriculture is addressed by Anderson (1992a,b). It is known that these markets are 
in many countries highly regulated and distorted by subsidies and barriers to trade.  Anderson 
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shows  that  the  correlation  between  domestic  prices and the utilisation of fertiliser and 
pesticides is positive and significant. High domestic prices for goods that are traded 
internationally are possible only if there are barriers to trade. Abolishing these barriers would 
result in a relocation of production from highly protected industrialised countries to less 
developed countries. There would be a shift in the use of fertiliser and pesticides from the 
industrialised to the developing countries. Since the less developed countries tend to use more 
labour-intensive methods of production that require less chemicals, one can conclude that the 
average use of these substances tends to decline. Similar results are obtained by 
Harold/Runge (1993) who find a significant positive effect of agricultural subsidies on the 
intensity of fertiliser use. 
Another case is the energy market. In most countries, the energy market is highly 
distorted. Removing these distortions by and allowing for free trade would have substantial 
effects. Burniaux/Martin/Oliveira-Martins (1992) use a computable general-equilibrium 
(CGE) model and show that the removal of existing distortions in energy markets, which 
predominantly take the shape of subsidisation for protectionist reasons, would result in a 
drastic reduction of CO2 emissions an a global scale. It should be noted, however, that CGE 
models cannot be used to test theories. They are calibrated models that a based on the validity 
of a particular theory and can, therefore, only be used for simulations but not for testing 
purposes.  
Notwithstanding that there are serious arguments for a positive impact of trade 
liberalisation on the environment, there are situations where the negative effects of free trade 
dominate the positive ones. An example is trade in endangered species. For example, Barbier/ 
Burgess/Swanson/Pearce (1990) and Barbier (1991) look at the market for ivory and 
concludes that barriers to trade such as  tariffs, quotas, and trade bans can contribute to the 
preservation of endangered species.  
Traditional trade theory is silent about trade costs. Thus, the literature on trade and the 
environment has neglected the issue of transportation externalities by and large. An exception 
is Gabel/Röller (1992). They investigate the effects of trade liberalisation on international 
transportation for a set of European countries. Non-tariff barrier have a significant negative 
effect on the volume of trade. Complete removal of these barriers would raise the volume of 
trade of by a quarter. It is argued that, everything else being equal, there would be a more than 
proportional increase in international transportation due to the increasing share of long-
distance traffic.  For a study looking at the particular case of trans-alpine traffic in Europe, see 
Reggiani (2000).  
 
6.4  Leakage Effects  
Up to now, there is no empirical evidence concerning the importance of leakage effects. What 
has been done, however, is an assessment of the potential importance ogf these effects by 
means of CGE models. CGE models cannot determine the magnitude of these effects 
empirically. They can be used for policy simulations and under the assumptions that the 
economic theory underlying the model and the chosen set of parameters used for the 
calibration are correct, one can determine ranges of leakage elasticities. The first attempts to 
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calculate leakage figures for carbon dioxide  emissions have been made in the first half of 
the 1990s by Oliveira-Martins et al. (1993), Felder/Rutherford (1993), Manne/Oliveira-
Martins (1994), and OECD (1995). The results are sensitive to the parameters chosen. 
Decisive parameters are energy supply and demand elasticities and the assumptions about 
future role of China in the world economy. Leakage elasticities are in the range of 3 to 40 per 
cent of original emission reductions. A. Ulph(1994a)  using a non-competitive partial-
equilibrium model which he calibrates to reflect the properties of the fertiliser industry finds 
leakage figures of even more than 60 per cent. A recent survey by Burniaux/Oliveira-Martins  
(2000)  summarises the results of various CGE models and arrives at the conclusion that 
carbon leakage elasticities should be expected to lie in the range of 2 to 20 per cent. The 
major part of this leakage is due to energy market interdependencies. Reduced energy   
demand in one country leads to lower energy prices in the world market and, therefore, to 
higher energy demand in other countries. As one may have expected from the results on the 
impact of environmental regulation on the patterns of trade, the leakage effect caused by 
changes in specialisation and corresponding price changes in markets for  final goods appears 
to be rather weak. The decisive energy market parameter is the supply elasticity of coal. With 
extremely (unrealistically) inelastic coal supply, leakage figures can approach 100 per cent. 
 
6.5 Green  Tariffs 
To my knowledge, there have not been empirical studies on the significance of environ-
mentally motivated barriers to trade. A simulation study by Mani (1996), however, has tried 
to quantify the impact of environmentally motivated tariffs on the patterns of trade. Starting 
from an existing partial equilibrium, a scenario was investigated in which the USA introduced 
countervailing tariffs that just offset the cost advantages foreign producers enjoyed because of 
laxer environmental standards abroad. It was shown that the impact of these tariffs on trade is 
very small. Even under unrealistic parameter constellations designed to obtain strong effects, 
the changes in trade revenues remained in the range of 2 to 3 per cent even for the pollution-
intensive industries. Basically, Mani (1996) asks the same question that has been posed in the 
literature on the effects of factor endowments on trade but reverses the direction of the 
mechanism. What would happen if comparative advantages caused by differences in environ-
mental regulation were eliminated by the introduction of countervailing tariffs. The results 
confirm the other existing evidence: trade and environmental regulation are only weakly 
linked.   
  
6.6  International Factor Movements 
Besides via trade in final commodities, environmental regulation can have an impact  on the 
allocation of factors via  trade in factors of production, i.e. mobile factors tend to move to less 
regulated jurisdictions. Walter (1982) using data on the sectoral and firm levels concludes that 
generally there is no evidence that pollution-intensive industries have moved to less regulated 
countries and regions. Exceptions from this rule are cases where major projects have been 
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obstructed for environmental reasons. This  finding is confirmed in subsequent studies by 
Bartik (1988), Leonard (1988), McConnell/Schwab (1990), and Levinson (1996). This is 
confirmed in the survey article by Jaffee et al. (1995). 
Rowland/Feiock (1991), in contrast, come to the conclusion that environmental regulation 
does affect locational decisions of investors. They look at the distribution of the investments 
of the chemical industry across federal states of the USA. Rowland/Feiock (1991)  find a non-
linear relationship between the stringency of environmental regulation and the investment 
decisions: there is threshold value of pollution-abatement costs below which relocational 
effects of environmental-policy changes cannot be observed.  List/Co (2000) and 
List/McHone (2000) also claim to find evidence in favour of relocational effects of environ-
mental policies. List/Co (2000) look at the regional distribution of foreign direct investment 
across the federal states of the USA and find parameter values with the expected signs and 
larger in magnitude than those derived in earlier publications. One may conclude that the 
foreign direct investment by multinational firms is more sensitive to environmental regulation 
than purely domestic investment. List/McHone (2000) use a US panel data set on a county 
basis. According to the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendment counties are designated in-attainment 
and out-of-attainment areas. An in-attainment county meets certain  well-defined 
environmental quality standards, an out-of-attainment county does not.  Out-of-attainment 
areas have to take measures to improve environmental quality, and this can translate into high 
costs for new plants that are subject to very strict environmental standards. The evidence  
reported by List/McHone (2000) suggests that the investment behaviour of manufacturers in 
pollution-intensive sectors is significantly influenced by environmental regulation in the 
predicted fashion. Since their results are derived on the basis of a distinction between in-
attainment and non-attainment areas, which differ substantially in the strictness of 
environmental regulation, they suggest the existence of substantial thresholds that have to be 
surpassed before environmental stringency starts to matter. 
Most of the studies reviewed up to now look at data for a specific country and analyse 
the effects of intranational variety of environmental standards on location. International 
differences in environmental regulation have been addressed as well. Hettige/Lucas/Wheeler 
(1992) and Lucas/Wheeler/Hettige (1992) claim to find evidence in favour of a relocation of 
environmentally intensive industries to developing countries. Low-income countries have ex-
perienced higher growth rates of pollution intensity per unit of output than high-income 
countries, particularly in the 1970s  and 1980s, when industrialized  countries tightened their 
environmental standards. This, however, is not a proof that there has been a relocation of dirty 
industries. Low/Yeats (1992) employ a similar approach but look at trade data covering the 
period from 1965 to 1988. They show that the share of "dirty" industries in exports has 
increased for some developing countries whereas it has declined for the industrial countries.  
On the whole, the direction and magnitude of the effect of environmental regulation on 
industry location is an unsettled issue. Many studies do not establish a significant 
relationship. If there is a relationship, it is likely that it is characterised by non-linearities. 
Small differences in environmental policies have no significant effect, large differences 
produce significant effects. Most of the papers use cross-sectional data and, therefore, the 
time components of environmental policy cannot be identified.  
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6.7  Not in My Backyard or a Race towards the Bottom? 
Levinson (1999) analysed taxes on hazardous waste in the USA. These taxes vary quite a bit 
across federal and they have changed during the time period 1988 to 1993.  It is shown that 
taxes have tended to rise and the empirical results suggest that this is explained by NIMBY 
behaviour. High taxes rates are used to keep waste outside the federal state borders . As a 
result, waste disposal in the USA has become more decentralised during the observation 
period. Levinson (2000) shows that the waste-intensive industries are those that are the least 
footloose. Environmental authorities can tax these industries at high rates without causing 
undesired relocation effects. 
Of course, these results apply to a particular part of the US economy and cannot be 
generalised. Anecdotal evidence suggests that NIMBY behaviour is not a singular 
phenomenon but can be observed in different industries and different countries. It is, however, 
much more difficult to empirically detect races towards the bottom where jurisdictions 
undercut each other in environmental taxes or standards. The benchmark to which real-world 
environmental taxes should be compared is the true marginal  environmental which in most 
cases is not accurately known. Thus, it is to be expected that the question whether the race-
towards-the-bottom hypothesis is supported  by the data will remain undecided. 
 
6.8  Foreign Debt and the Environment 
A part of theoretical literature and many policy oriented papers as well have argued that 
foreign debt of developing countries has a negative impact on environmental quality. Highly 
indebted countries have incentives to overuse their natural resources. Diwan/Shafik (1992) 
use a sample of 109 countries. In a regression analysis with CO2 emissions per capita being 
the dependent variable, it is shown that per-capita foreign debt has a positive significant effect 
on emissions.  
 
6.9  Conclusions from the Empirical Literature 
There are two important conclusions to be drawn from the empirical literature on trade and 
the environment: 
 
•  The impact of environmental regulation on international trade and factor allocation is 
rather weak. Many studies do not find significant parameters.  For particular industries 
and in the case of  substantial inter-jurisdictional differences in environmental regulation, 
the data support the theory. 
 
•  On average, trade liberalisation is good for the environment. 
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The small and often insignificant effects of  environmental regulation can be explained as 
follows. See Levinson (1996) and Jeppesen/Folmer (2000).  First, in most industries, the cost 
of complying with environmental regulation is rather small compared to other cost 
components such as labour, capital and intermediate inputs. OECD figures suggest that the 
share of total costs that can be attributed to environmental regulation is about 2 per cent on 
average. Second, the move towards stricter environmental standards has been an almost 
simultaneous one in many countries. Thus, the cross-country variability of environmental 
regulation has been rather small in the past. Third, even if differences in environmental 
policies exist, historical experience suggests that less regulated countries will follow the trend 
and adjust their policies towards those of the first movers. Thus, rational investment decisions 
may be based on the assumption of converging environmental policies. Fourth, consumers 
and downstream producers often refuse to buy commodities from manufacturers that exploit 
the advantages of investing in pollution havens. If multinational firms invest in lax-regulation 
developing countries, they therefore often install technologies that comply with the strict 
regulation of their home countries. Sometimes they even require the fulfilment of strict 
environmental criteria from their upstream suppliers. Fifth, there is the empirical problem of 
how to measure environmental stringency. This has been mentioned already, and it is possible 
that a part of the problem of the lack of empirical evidence is merely a measurement problem 
As far as the effects of trade liberalisation are concerned, the composition effects are 
very small. Since environmental regulation and the allocation of the factors of production are 
only loosely linked, trade liberalisation has only small effects on the environment via 
structural change. The most important impact is that of the income increase. With higher 
income, tighter environmental standards and higher prices for environmentally intensively 
produced goods become affordable and in the longer term, this leads to improvements in 
environmental quality.  
 
7 Institutional  Issues 
Institutions change. Nonetheless, it is sensible to address the institutional framework in which 
trade-and-environment issues are currently embedded. The basic problems here are to avoid 
that particular interest groups are over-represented in the political process and to find 
mechanisms by which international trade and environmental disputes can be solved. The 
problem to design institutions that resist regulatory capture will not be addressed here. 
Instead, I will concentrate on international aspects and discuss international agreements that 
address environmental and trade issues simultaneously.  
 
7.1  International Environmental Agreements with Trade Provisions 
As the theoretical literature has shown, trade interventions can sometimes make sense for 
environmental reasons. Esty (1994) finds that since the 1930s there have been 20 multilateral 
environmental agreements that allow for trade restrictions. The most significant of these are 
probably the Convention of Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES), 
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the Montreal Protocol on Substances that  Deplete the Ozone Layer (hereafter: Montreal 
Protocol), and the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Waste and Its Disposal (hereafter: Basel Convention).  
CITES went into force in 1973. It is a multilateral agreement which regulates the trade 
in rare species of animals and plants or in products made from them. Many of these species 
are threatened by extinction and often species extincion is not driven by domestic demand but 
by import demand from abroad. Therefore main instrument used by the CITES signatory 
parties to preserve them is trade restrictions. All international trade in rare species requires 
import and export permits and signatory parties are given the right to restrict international 
trade. Free trade is non-existent for in the area covered by CITES. Apparently, these trade 
restrictions are regarded as being justified not only in environmentalist circles but also in the 
international-trade community. 
The Montreal Protocol, launched in 1987, regulates the use of substances that deplete 
the ozone layer, in particular chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). The signatory parties agree to 
participate in a schedule of CFC reduction until a complete phase-out. The Montreal Protocol 
contains interesting trade provisions. See Enders/Porges (1992) for a more detailed 
discussion. Signatory parties to the Protocol are requested to ban imports and exports from 
non-parties of different types of goods relevant to the process of ozone depletion The ban 
proceeds in a number of steps that are defined in Article 4 of the Protocol. Firstly, imports of 
controlled substances themselves, mainly CFCs, are banned. The second step requires a ban 
of products that contain controlled substances. Finally, an import ban of products that do not 
contain controlled substances but have been produced  with them becomes possible.  To the 
trade economist, these trade restrictions are interesting for two reasons. First, the introduction 
of trade restrictions is based not only on properties of a good as such but also on the way in 
which it has been produced.26 Secondly, this measure catches two birds with one stone. On 
the one hand, it serves as a sanction to discipline non-compliants. On the other hand, it 
reduces leakage effects like the optimal tariff that has been mentioned in Section 1 and, 
therefore, is in the self-interest of the countries using the instrument. This increases the 
credibility of the sanction and reduces the likelihood of non-compliance. 
The Basel Convention constrains international trade in hazardous waste. Its basic 
principles are the requirement of written consent by the authorities of the importing, exporting 
and transit states, the duty to re-import and the prohibition of waste movements to non-
parties. See Esty (1994a, p. 280). All international waste trade must be supervised by the 
authorities of the states involved. Purely private transactions are not allowed. Information 
requirements have to be met and written permissions by the importing and the transit 
countries are needed Moreover, the exporting country is responsible for re-importing the toxic 
waste if the movement cannot be completed in accordance with the terms of the contract and 
if no alternatives are available for an environmentally sound disposal. The export of toxic 
waste to non-parties is - with some exemptions - prohibited. There are some problems 
                         
26  There is currently only a single other environmental agreement that provides for trade 
restrictions in case the commodity is unsustainably produced: the Convention of the 
Prohibition of Fishing with Long Drift Nets in the South Pacific of 1989. See Esty (1994a, 
280). 
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inherent in such a convention , e.g. the  definition of what is hazardous waste. To the 
trade economist, the interesting aspect of  the Basel Convention is the elimination of all 
private trade. All transboundary movements of hazardous waste are state-controlled and to 
some extent also state-managed. This restriction and the re-importation requirement have 
been implemented to protect importing countries, particularly developing ones, from imports 
of hazardous substances they cannot or do not want to handle. The exclusion of non-parties 
from the trade may be viewed as a violation of the non-discrimination principle.   
 
7.2  The GATT and the Environment 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was formulated in the 1940s, a time when 
environmental issues were not an issue. Therefore, the environment is not mentioned 
explicitly. The main purpose of the GATT has been to promote the free exchange of goods. 
Its main principle is non-discrimination and the instrument for its implementation is the most-
favoured-nation clause (Articles I and III). Trade restrictions may take the shape of tariffs 
only, non-tariff barriers to trade are prohibited (Article XI). Countervailing duties are possible 
in the cases of foreign dumping and subsidisation. However, there is nothing in the GATT 
that could make these measures applicable to environmental dumping. Other barriers to trade 
may be used if one of the escape clauses in the GATT applies. One of them is Article XX, 
which is now used to deal with environmental issues:  
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;.... 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are 
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption; 
Although the historical roots of these parts of Article XX have nothing to do with 
environmental concern, they are now used to deal with environmental issues. In some 
respects, this article is rather vague. For instance, it is unclear if  trade in goods that have only  
been produced in a way regarded as being unsustainable but are not harmful by themselves 
may be restricted. It is also far from clear under which circumstances discrimination becomes 
arbitrary or unjustifiable.  
Some GATT Panels offer insights on how the relationship of free trade and 
environmental protection is being viewed by the GATT. The tuna dispute between Mexico 
and the USA was the most prominent case in the early 1990s.27 The US had launched an 
                         
27  For a more detailed discussion, see the original GATT Panel, GATT (1993) but also 
Körber (1998). 
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embargo on Mexican tuna imports since the  Mexican tuna fishery killed more dolphins 
than was compatible with the US Marine Mammals Protection Act. The GATT Panel decided 
that this ban was incompatible with GATT rules. The USA had argued that this measure was 
in accordance with Article III (which states that imported goods should be treated in the same 
way as like or competing domestic goods) and with Article XX. Moreover, it was claimed 
that Mexican tuna was sufficiently different from tuna caught by US fishermen since Mexico 
used different (less dolphin-safe) fishing methods and that, therefore, the non-discrimination 
principle of Article III was not applicable. Article XX was used to justify the import ban as a 
means of environmental policy. The GATT decided that Article III referred to products but 
not to methods of production and that the ban, therefore, was not in accordance with the non-
discrimination principle. This can be interpreted as an acknowledgement of the origin 
principle. Differences across countries in the regulation of production processes do not 
constitute a justification to intervene into foreign trade. The GATT Panel's main arguments 
concerning Article XX were that the measure was discriminatory, that it was a disguised 
barrier to trade, and that less distorting measures of environmental policy would have been 
possible in this case.  Moreover, the Panel argued that Article XX does not permit a country 
to take measures to enforce its own environmental standards outside its jurisdiction.  
A more recent GATT Panel decision in the shrimp-turtle case (see GATT, 1998) 
comes to a different view although the ultimate result is the same: the trade restriction used to 
protect the environment is not in accordance with GATT rules. The US had launched an 
embargo on shrimps import from various Asian countries since the shrimp fisheries in these 
countries caused the killing of sea turtles that are threatened by extinction. This new Panel did 
not refer the extraterritoriality principle, which is nowhere contained in the GATT. Moreover, 
it did not discard the measure because it discriminated against "like products". Nevertheless, 
the way in which the embargo was implemented, was regarded as being discriminatory. This 
Panel marks a significant progress in the GATT's perception of environmental issues. Two 
sources of incompatibility between the GATT in its earlier interpretation and international 
environmental agreements are eliminated: the extraterritoriality principle and the principle 
that commodities cannot be defined by the way in which they are produced. According to the 
new Panel, it is now compatible with GATT to use trade interventions to protect 
extraterritorial resources, and the way in which imported goods have been produced matters.  
Relating this to the Montreal Protocol, for instance, one is lead to conclude that the trade 
interventions required by the Protocol are compatible with the GATT. There is nothing in the 
GATT to prevent the signatory parties of the Montreal Protocol to protect the ozone layer, an 
extraterritorial resource, by using trade sanctions including the ban of imports of commodities 
that have only been produced with CFCs without containing them.  
Given this new interpretation of GATT rules by a GATT panel, the necessity of 
adjusting the world trade order to the requirements of environmental protection looks less 
pressing than it did in the mid 1990s. Nonetheless it might be useful to clarify the relationship 
of GATT rules and those international environmental agreements that permit or even require 
trade restrictions. One possibility is to use an "environmental window" like Article 104 of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement. This article states that international environmental 
agreements like the Montreal Protocol, the Convention of Trade in Endangered Species, and 
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the  Basel  Convention,  that  propose  restrictions of international trade, are given 
prevalence over the NAFTA in the case of inconsistencies. At the time this survey article is 
being written environmental problems are a top issue in the World Trade Organization and it 
would be pure speculation to try and predict the outcome current negotiation process.   
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8  Summary and Conclusions 
The literature on trade and the environment is still not a homogenous body.  In economic 
theory, there are basically two types of papers, those that start from the classical and 
neoclassical trade theories based on Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin-type thought, and those 
using non-competitive models. Particularly the last group of models produces a set of rather 
diverse results. Especially, multi-stages oligopoly models are highly sensitive to the 
assumptions made concerning the sequence of moves and  the shape of the functions. Thus, a 
short and clear policy implication is hard to give. Similar considerations apply to models that 
look at international factor movements, in particular foreign direct investment, from a 
theoretical perspective. The consideration of distorted economies leads to second-best results 
that have rather diverse policy implications as well. Nonetheless, one should not loose sight 
of the first best. This first best policy is:  strict environmental standards plus free trade. 
Moreover, it is important to note that the subsidiarity principle applies to environmental 
policy as well. With the exception of global pollutants, there is no reason to harmonise 
environmental standards internationally. See Hansson (1990) and Bhagwati/Srinivasan (1997) 
on this. Nonetheless, international policy coordination is necessary in the case of transfrontier 
pollution. On the empirical side, one must concede that the link between environmental 
policies on the one hand and foreign trade and foreign direct investment is much weaker than 
one may have thought a decade ago. This is good news to the policy maker, to the 
environmentalist, and to the industry lobbyist. The industries affected by environmental 
regulation suffer much less than is often thought. There may be some exceptions but the 
impact of environmental regulation on structural change is small. Many environmentalists 
fear that liberalisation leads to additional environmental disruption and to a race towards the 
bottom. This view is not supported by the data. On average, trade liberalisation seems to be 
environmentally beneficial (albeit exceptions exist, of course) and environmental laxity is, if 
at all, a rather ineffective instrument to increase competitiveness. For policy maker, matters 
become easier since environmental and trade policies can be by and large be regarded as 
separate issues. 
As regards economic research, extensions and refinements of existing models are still 
possible. To me some areas seem to be particularly promising. One is the consideration of 
endogenous market structures. Most theoretical models assume either perfect competition or a 
constant number of firms. The intra-industry trade model may be a starting point. Closely 
related to this is the consideration of economic geography. The state of the art is surveyed by 
Fujita/Krugman/Venables (1999) and it seems to be promising to apply these concepts to 
environmental issues. A first step into this direction has been undertaken by Haavio (2000). 
The third theoretical aspect which should attract more research interest is the political 
economy of environmental regulation in open economies. In this area, the literature is still 
rather patchy. A better understanding of this process is desirable - not only for its own sake 
but also for the purpose to design better institutions such that environmental protection and 
environmental protectionism can be disentangled in the policy process. On the empirical side, 
much more evidence on the linkages between trade and the environment will be collected. 
This deepens our knowledge about what drives the real world and about the appropriateness 
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of our theoretical process. My forecast is that  this empirical research will not produce very 
surprising results but confirm and refine what is known already. Should the insight that 
environmental regulation and foreign trade are only loosely linked be confirmed, then would 
have a very simple policy implication: the environment and international competitiveness are 
separate issues and the purpose of environmental policy is to get the prices right.   
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Figure 2: Gains from trade for the exporting country   90
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Figure 5: Welfare Effects of Leakage 
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Figure 8: Emission taxes to attract foreign investment 
 
 
























Figure 10: Optimal Use of Renewable Resources 
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